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Abstract: The present paper is targeted on three landmarks in the long story of
the paribhāṣās’ development. Two of these landmarks descended from the
earliest testimony of Vyākaraṇa meta-rules, i. e. those included in Pāṇini’s
grammar (fifth–fourth century BCE), and one which has been handed down as
the first independent collection of paribhāṣās and attributed to Vyāḍi. In parti-
cular a shift is highlighted between Kātyāyaṇa’s (third century BCE) integrative
approach (vacana) and Patañjali’s (second century BCE) recourse to implicit
paribhāṣās in the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a powerful hermeneutical tool. A shift that
helps in interpreting the need for a validation and collection of implicit
pāṇinian paribhāṣās as carried out by authors such as Vyāḍi.
Keywords: paribhāṣā, meta-rules, sanskrit grammatical tradition, vacana, Vyāḍi,
Paribhāṣāvṛtti, hermeneutics
1 The classic theory of paribhāṣās in grammar
Paribhāṣās, namely general statements aimed at helping interpret a (techni-
cal) text correctly,1 have a very long history within the grammatical tradition.
They begin with Pāṇini’s Aṣṭhādhyāyī meta-rules (c.a. 5th–4th BCE) embed-
ded in the text itself, up to the emergence, with Vyāḍi, of an autonomous
exegetical genre – a collection of paribhāṣās – culminating in the summa we
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owe to Nāgeśa. The term itself is not used by Pāṇini, but the first occurrences
are already found in Kātyāyana2 – together with the more generic term
vacana – and it has a stable and codified usage in Patañjali. Such a long
intellectual history requires an interpretation to single out the different roles
this instrument has played in such diverse cultural (and textual) environ-
ments. In our contribution we shall focus on the three most ancient authors
of grammatical tradition, namely, Pāṇini and his first two commentators,
Kātyāyana and Patañjali (c.a 250 BCE and 150 BCE), and compare them
with the first collectors and editors of paribhāṣās (from Vyāḍi3 onwards)
who gave rise to an altogether independent textual genre.
Before investigating the origins and first steps of this metalinguistic instru-
ment, we should make a point about the classical theory of paribhāṣās in
grammar, a theory already seen at work in the first paribhāṣā-collections, such
as Vyāḍi’s.
a. All the metalinguistic conventions stipulated in the Aṣṭhādhyāyī are assi-
gned for the purpose of limiting the scope of a wider (and commonly
accepted) metalinguistic principle that would otherwise be assumed in
interpreting the text.
b. It is therefore legitimate to postulate that Pāṇini does not enunciate all the
metalinguistic principles he assumes to be valid, but only the ones he
deems strictly necessary, leaving the others implicit.4
2 The term is used precisely twice, i. e. vt 4 ad A 1.1.69 and vt 4 ad A 1.3.11, in both cases with
reference to Paṇini’s explicit paribhāṣās. Patañjali’s usage, on the other hand, already covers
both explicit and implicit metarules.
3 It is not so easy to define the chronology of Vyaḍi’s work, since the proper name Vyāḍi seems
to be overused in grammatical and lexicographical contexts, such as the Mahābhāṣya, the
Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya or the Ganapāṭha, as clearly explained by Wujastyk 1993: XIV–XXIV. This
Paribhāṣā-collection might even date back to the 3rd c. BCE and pre-date Kātyāyana’s Vārttikas,
if its author were the sponsor of the thesis according to which dravya “individual substance” is
the default-meaning of words, mentioned in vt 45 on A 1.2.64 and opposed to Vājapyāyana
(quoted in vt 35 on the same A rule), who is for the ākṛti “generic form”.
4 Particularly interesting in this respect is Nāgeśa’s incipit of his Paribhāṣenduśekhara which
states that Pāṇini left implicit some rules that earlier grammarians had stated explicitly, and
that the task of the authors of paribhāṣā-texts is to recover and explain them:
prācinavaiyākaraṇatantre vācanikāny atra pāṇinīyatantre jñāpakanyāyasiddhāni
bhāṣyavārttikayor nibaddhāni yāni paribhāṣārūpāṇi tāni vyākhyāyante “The paribhāṣās –
which in the works of earlier grammarians were explicitly stated, and which here in that of
Pāṇini are established by means of suggestions and reasonings, and which are contained in the
Bhāṣya and in the Vārttika – will be explained [in this text].”
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c. This does not however lead to an unbridled rise in implicit Pāṇinian
hermeneutical principles. Commentators have established ways of check-
ing the legitimacy of a given paribhāṣā, which are listed here in order of
frequency.
– Some paribhāṣās are established by an indication (jñāpakasiddha) found in
Pāṇini’s text itself. This indication is, in most cases, a supposed redundancy
in Pāṇini’s text that can be justified – or rather, is no longer a redundancy –
if the principle at stake is assumed to be accepted by Pāṇini. Vyāḍi’s
commentator already provides finalized examples of this kind of reasoning,
such as his treatment of VPBh 9 nānubandhakṛtam anekaltvam “The condi-
tion of being polyphonic is never created by a marker”. To give an example,
the affix of the first verbal class ŚaP, where both Ś and P are markers, is a
single sound affix. The indication that Pāṇini accepts this meta-principle
even though he does not state it explicitly is to be found in a rule which is
also a meta-rule, i. e. A 1.1.55 anekal śit sarvasya which states that poly-
phonic substitutes and single sound substitutes with marker Ś replace the
whole form mentioned as the substituendum.5 If Pāṇini did not follow the
principle of not counting markers to determine the number of sounds of a
given linguistic string, the mention of single-sound substitutes with marker Ś
(e. g. Śi) would be redundant, since Śi will obviously be polyphonic. This
supposed redundancy is the hint given by Pāṇini of his implicit acceptance
of the principle.6
– Several other paribhāṣās are established by way of a commonly accepted
everyday norm or practice (lokanyāyasiddha). To stay with examples from
Vyāḍi, VPBh 19 saty api saṃbhave bādhanaṃ bhavati states that even when
two rules could apply contemporaneously, only one is used.7 This is stated
to deal with some difficulties such as the undesired alternant application of
both the specific pronominal infix akac (taught by A 5.3.71) and the general
5 e. g. A 2.4.53 bruvo vaciḥ teaches that vac- should be used instead of the whole verbal base
brū (and not just for its final sound). Similarly, in the case of single sound substitutes with the
marker Ś: 7.1.20 jaśśasoḥ śiḥ teaches that Śi should replace the whole of the forms Jas and Śas.
6 Comm. ad VPBh 9: yad ayaṃ anekāl śit sarvasyeti śidgrahaṇaṃ karoti | tatra hi sānubandha
ādeśo ’nubandhena sārdham anekāl eva bhavati | tatrānekāl ity eva sa sarvādeśaḥ siddhaḥ |
nārthaḥ śitkaraṇena | paśyati tv ācāryaḥ yo ’nubandhena sākam anekālādeśaḥ sa ekāl eva | sa ca
na sarvādeśaḥ | tasmāc chidgrahaṇam |
7 This contradicts the preceding pbh which states that the blocking of one rule only arises
when two rules cannot apply together. The pbh should probably be considered anitya, i. e. not
compulsory, since its application would lead to serious problems.
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affix ka (A 5.3.70).8 The principle is assessed through a maxim widely
accepted in daily activities, as when a person tells another “Give curds to
the Brahmins, buttermilk to (the Brahmin) Kauṇḍinya”, this second person
will only give buttermilk to the Brahmin Kauṇḍinya even though, as a
Brahmin, he would also be entitled to curds.9 That these maxims are
assumed to be widely accepted justifies the fact that Pāṇini did not feel
any need to state them explicitly in the text.
– Others are stated by logical reasoning (nyāyasiddha). For example, VPBh 35
nimittābhāve naimittikasyāpy abhāvo bhavati, stating that in the absence of a
cause there is no effect, is argued on the basis that it is logical, just as the
shadow created by an umbrella disappears once the umbrella is taken
away.10
– A fourth category is sometimes evoked, namely that of the paribhāṣās
vācanikī, whose authority derives from their being uttered by reliable
persons.
d. A paribhāṣā, legitimated by one of the arguments above, must also prove
useful in rules other than the one used as an intimation in order to be fully
accepted as authoritative.
To sum up, the theory of implicit paribhāṣas emerges from an analysis of
the practice of explicit paribhāṣas observed in Pāṇini, and particularly from
the fact that he does not aim at any explicit regulation of all the metalinguistic
conventions at work in his grammar, but only those whose usage needs
somehow to be restricted/specified. This has opened the door to a good deal
of speculation on implicit paribhāṣās. These, nevertheless, show different
degrees of proximity to the source texts, from the principles hinted at by
8 Comm. ad VPBh 19: kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | sarvanāmno ’kajvidhīyamāno ’dhikṛtaṃ
kaṃ bādhate | asti ca saṃbhavo yad ubhayaṃ paryāyeṇa syāt “What is the purpose of indicating
this [paribhāṣā]? [The purpose is that] akaC, which is prescribed for a pronoun (by A 5.3.71),
blocks ka which is taught by the adhikāra ( = A 5.3.70). And there is the possibility that they
might be applied alternately”. This would lead to the undesired forms idakaṃka/adakaska.
9 Comm. ad VPBh 19: kutaḥ | loke dṛṣṭvāt | evaṃ hi dṛśyate loke brāhmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatāṃ
takraṃ kauṇḍinyāyeti saty api saṃbhave dadhidānasya takradānaṃ nivartakaṃ bhavati | asti ca
saṃbhavaḥ yad dahi kauṇḍinyāya dīyate takraṃ ca.
10 Comm. ad VPBh 35: tad yathā chattranimittā chāyā chattrāpāye na bhavati. In Vyāḍi the
argument is nevertheless followed by a jñāpaka; this is quite common in his text both for nyāya
and lokanyāya arguments and, as we will see, is the clue to a deep change in the function of
these statements within the whole exegetic and interpretative mechanism.
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Pāṇini himself, to those so general as to be recognised as simple common-
sense aphorisms. The work of the collectors of paribhāṣas has been to gather,
evaluate and discuss these principles, which were actually already extensively
used by the first commentators on Pāṇini as sharp and useful hermeneutic
tools. In the discussion that follows, we shall focus on these first testimonies to
investigate points of agreement with and differences from what we have called
the classical theory of paribhāṣas, to see whether this helps us in tracing the
first steps in the history of this tool.
2 The Aṣṭādhyāyī ancillary rules as an intrinsic
part of the text
2.1 Typology of Pāṇini’s ancillary rules
As we well know, the Aṣṭādhyāyī contains both operational rules (vidhi-sūtras),
which mainly enjoin affixes (pratyayas), increments (āgamas) and substitutes
(ādeśas), and ancillary rules. These are traditionally divided into three distinct
classes namely adhikāra-, saṃjñā- and paribhāṣā-sūtras, i. e. rules governing
whole sections of grammar, names and exegetical conventions/guidelines. Only
the class of adhikāras is signalled as such by Pāṇini,11 the other two are to some
extent later categorizations, albeit with a sound basis in the A.
Many of these ancillary rules are gathered in a single place, at the beginning
of the work, just as they are in some Śrautasūtra-texts (see Chierichetti’s contribu-
tion) and show a close relation to the bulk of the text. To the best of our
knowledge, no doubt has been cast upon the attribution of this group of rules,
nor has anybody advanced the hypothesis that the whole corpus of these initial
rules was a late interpolation, even though it is self-evident that the nature of this
part of the A is inherently open to changes and insertions. We cannot therefore
exclude that e. g. A 1.2.46 has actually been interpolated, since the principles of
the correct use of ca and of the anuvṛtti seem to have been violated (as underlined
by Joshi/Bhate 198312), or that even the whole section A 1.2.53–57 is the fruit of a
progressive insertion of ‘semantic’ provisions, as suggested from the time of
Böthlingk’s translation onward, mainly on the basis of Pāṇini’s usus scribendi.13
11 The headings are marked with a svarita accent according to A 1.3.11 svaritenādhikāraḥ.
12 Joshi/Bhate 1983: 197; 217.
13 see e. g. Palsule 1949; Wezler 1976: 366 ff.
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On the other hand, most of this large introductory collection of rules
included in the first adhyāya of the A are known by Kātyāyana, who overtly
comments them.
We shall present here a short survey of some very well-known ancillary rules
in the A in order to single out the characteristic features of each, attempting to
account, as far as possible, for the concept behind the mechanism set to work by
Pāṇini.
The third chapter of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, for instance, starts with the following
plain set of three governing-elements (adhikāras), which extend up to the end of
the fifth chapter:
A 3.1.1: pratyayaḥ |
It is an affix.
A 3.1.2: paraś ca |
And it is following.
A 3.1.3: ādyudāttaś ca |
And with high pitch on its first vowel.
Thus, these three governing-elements continue to apply to all the units taught in
the rules included throughout chapters 3, 4 and 5, by merely relying on the
technical anaphora-device called anuvṛtti, which permit the extension of these
words as part of all the following sūtras included in this section, i. e. their
simultaneous inclusion in all these rules. Consistently, all these rules enjoin
some units termed ‘pratyayas’, which are high-pitched on their first vowel, and
juxtaposed after some others. As a consequence, e. g. A 3.1.5 gup-tij-kid-bhyaḥ
san actually enjoins the application of the high-pitched (ādyudāttaḥ) affix
(pratyayaḥ) sáN after (paraḥ) the units gup- “to hide”, tij- “to sharpen” and
kit- “to take care”.
A smaller section included in this broad group of affixation-rules begins
with the adhikāra A 3.1.91 dhātoḥ “after a verbal base” and closes with the end
of chapter 3, so that each rule in section A 3.1.91–3.4.117 has to be additionally
considered as taught “after a verbal base”. For instance, A 3.1.93 kṛd atiṄ gives
the name kṛt for a high-pitched (adhikāra A 3.1.3) affix (adhikāra 3.1.1) which
follows (adhikāra 3.1.2) a verbal base (adhikāra 3.1.91), provided it is not a verbal
parasmaipada or an ātmanepada ending (tiṄ): i. e. a deverbal or primary nomi-
nal affix.
On the other hand, rule A 3.1.93, supplemented with all the previous
governing-elements, is a naming rule (saṃjñā-sūtra), i. e. a rule which establis-
hes a terminological convention whose domain generally extends to the whole
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grammar.14 As we have seen in examples A 3.1.1–3, adhikāras strictly rely on the
precise place they occupy in the grammar. All the rules subsequent to a govern-
ing-element, i. e. which are included under their relevant adhikāra, involve it as
a part of their wording. As a consequence, the precise boundaries of the domain
of each governing-element are clearly fixed with a considerable saving of details
to be explicitly included by every rule pertaining to this domain.
By comparison, the specific features of naming rules plainly emerge: their
domain is independent of the place they occupy, as clearly shown by the
following example. The double naming rules A 1.2.45–6 – devoted to the term
prātipadika – employ our term kṛt, even though they occur far before the naming
rule that teaches it (A 3.1.93).
A 1.2.45: arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam |
A 1.2.46: kṛttaddhitasamāsāś ca |
A unit other than a verbal base or an affix, which is endowed with a
meaning, has to be called prātipadika (1.2.45) and a unit ending with a ḳṛt-
or a taddhita-affix or a compound unit [has also to be called prātipadika]
(1.2.46).15
Once the name-teaching-rule has established a conventional meaning, it will be
applied every time the name is used and, in the case of words with a non-
technical meaning (such as vṛddhi, lit. “growth”), it will be limited to what is
explicitly taught. In whatever operational rule it occurs, a name works as if it
were a sort of whistle which ‘musters’ the relevant rule (or rules) for its inter-
pretation, so that they contribute to constitute the complete wording of this rule.
This is actually one of two traditional interpretations of the naming mecha-
nism, namely, the so-called kāryakāla-interpretation formulated by Vyāḍi (VPBh
45 =NPBh 3), as kāryakālaṃ saṃjñāparibhāṣam “(technical) names and meta-
rules [are understood] at the [appointed time, i. e. at the] operation time”. The
other interpretation, i. e. the so-called yathoddeśam, conversely aims at sum-
moning in the naming rule itself all the operational rules which use the relevant
name. Thus, the “definition” (or more precisely the “name-giving rule”) is
widened because of the operational rules involving it. This latter is also pro-
posed as a paribhāṣā from the twelfth century CE onward (see Puruṣottama PBh
14 However, there are some rules, such as A 1.2.43 limiting to compounds the definition of
upasarjana as what is expressed with the first ending, or A 3.1.92 giving the name upapada to
what is expressed in the seventh ending in the section of primary derivates.
15 The names kṛt and taddhita are actually used here to designate nominal stems ending with a
kṛt-affix or a taddhita-affix respectively, in accordance with A 1.1.72.
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105 and Sīradeva PBh 116) and it constitutes the NPBh 2: yathoddeśam
saṃjñāparibhāṣam “(technical) names and interpretation-rules [are understood]
in accordance with [the place where] they are stated”. In both interpretations,
the automatic involvement of a meta-rule by another rule or rules is due to the
presence of a specific sign linking the two rules together. This sign is the name
itself in the case of a naming rule; in interpretation rules (paribhāṣā), on the
other hand, it is another feature (liṅga) quoted as distinctive in the meta-rule. As
we have just seen, the two traditional ways of interpreting saṃjñāsūtras are
shared by the paribhāṣā- themselves. Self-evidently, commentators wondered
about the location of this kind of ancillary rules, possibly because their strategic
“competitors”, i. e. adhikārasūtras were, conversely, so neatly grounded in the
place they occupied.
In fact, rules teaching names have more than one point in common with
rules teaching conventions. Let us start by having a look at two well-known
ones, crucial for a correct interpretation of Pāṇini’s syntax.
A 1.1.66: tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya |
“A unit which is expressly indicated by means of the seventh nominal
ending refers to an operation on something which precedes it,” i. e. the
referent of a locative form in grammar is the right-hand context of an
operation which applies to what precedes this mentioned unit.
A 1.1.67: tasmād iti uttarasya |
“A unit which is expressly indicated by means of the fifth nominal ending
refers to an operation on something which follows,” i. e. the referent of an
ablative form in grammar is the left-hand context of an operation which
applies to what follows this mentioned unit.16
Both these meta-rules teach nothing that is not included in the common usage of
these two nominal endings, and they merely specify the only permissible inter-
pretation to be adopted among the different ones otherwise available to a
Sanskrit speaker. We have relied on the first meta-rule e. g. by translating A
3.1.5 gup-tij-kid-bhyaḥ “after the units gup-, tij- and kit” here-above. As far as the
seventh ending is concerned, the general operational rule of semivowel repla-
cement is a good example: A 6.1.77 iko yaṇ aci17 “A sound denoted by iK ( = i, u,
ṛ, ḷ) is replaced by the corresponding sounds denoted by yaṆ (y, v, r, l) when a
16 Recently an interesting proposal has been made by Scharf to interpret both these meta-rules
as limited to the context of substitution. Cf. Scharf 2003 (2012) and Candotti 2012: 33–34.
17 The whole wording of rule A 6.1.77 should be <dīrghāt padāntāt vā hrasvyasya > iko yaṇ aci
according to Patañjali (M 1.52 l. 2–53 l. 13 ad A 6.1.77). See Candotti/Pontillo forthcoming § 5.1.
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sound denoted by aC (a, i, u, ṛ, ḷ, e, o, ai, au, i. e. a vowel) follows [in sandhi].”
E. g. *madhu atra >madhv atra. A number of interpretation-rules are in fact
concentrated, like name-teaching rules, in the first part of the grammar, but
they actually apply to the whole Aṣṭādhyāyī (see below § 2.2). Commentators
interpret them through the same two devices we have seen for name-teaching
rules, that is, either by recalling the interpretation-rule in the contexts to which
they are relevant, i. e. contexts that show the distinctive feature or liṅga mentio-
ned in the interpretation rule itself,18 or by mustering all the relevant operative
rules together with the interpretative one.
Nonetheless, some interpretation-rules are limited to a specific domain and
to a specific place in grammar, such as A 1.4.1 ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā “Only one
name [among those introduced by the rules of the following section] [may apply
at once] up to kaḍāra (2.2.38).” Whenever two technical terms taught in the
domain of this section of grammar become applicable to a single object, only
one is actually applied. At the same time, such meta-rules are often classified as
adhikāra-rules by modern scholars like Cardona19 and Sharma20.
2.2 Commentarial comparison between heading- and
interpretation rules
What is therefore the crucial difference between the so-called headings
(adhikāra) on the one hand, and interpretation-rules and naming rules on the
other? It is difficult to find explicit answers in Pāṇini himself, as some rules may
be characterized – as we have seen – by an ambiguous or joint status: since the
svarita-pitch that should mark the heading21 was lost in the early stages of the
tradition of the text, indeed, from the beginning, commentators had to integrate
it by independent reasoning. While the prototypic tokens of both kinds of rules
are quite clearly established, the boundary between the two seems to be fuzzy.
Paribhāṣās are prototypically context-free full sentences meant for interpreting
any relevant rule in the text, and headings are fragments subsidiary to the rules
immediately following, but there are numerous in-between cases: e. g. the status
of A 2.1.1 samārthaḥ padavidiḥ was already discussed by Patañjali (see below).
18 In our examples, the usage of an ablative ending for A 1.1.66 and of a locative ending for A
1.1.67.
19 e. g. Cardona 1997: 66ff.
20 Sharma 1987–2003, e. g. vol. 2: 203.
21 As taught by A 1.3.11.
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In Pāṇini, what seems to keep together naming-rules and interpretation rules
on the one hand, and headings on the other is the fact that neither is independently
valid. Indeed both exist as a function of other rules (parārtha) and extend, so to say,
their function over these rules. The capacity to extend a function over other rules – a
capacity intimately linkedwith the condition of being subservient to them– is by no
means unique to meta-rules; on the contrary, it characterizes operational rules as
well,22 and was used in early times under parallel technical traditions, particularly
in ritual exegesis. When discussing such a case of extension, Jaimini uses the
standard comparison of a lamp, often found in grammatical tradition.
MS 11.1.61: vibhavād vā pradīpavat |
Or like a lamp, on account of the capacity [of its light] to expand.
Here, the reference is to a kind of subsidiary rite (aṅga), which provides benefits
for more than one primary rite, even though it is performed only once. The
simile is included in Jaimini’s discussion on the possibility for a single subsi-
diary ritual action to be simultaneously (yaugapad) helpful for more than one
primary rite, provided that they share the same purpose (MS 11.1.57: ekārthyād
[…]). Nevertheless, the statement that the simultaneous effectiveness of a single
rite for many primary rites is granted by its acting ‘like a lamp’ might be super-
seded, according to the opponent, if there were a specific injunction for the
focused subsidiary, as advanced in the following sūtra:
MS 11.1.62: arthāt tu loke vidhitaḥ pratipradhānaṃ syāt |
But since in ordinary life (the position of a lamp) is prescribed by the aim
(i. e. by the needs of each case), it might have to be [repeated] along with
[each] principal rite because of the injunction.
The final position, on the other hand, confirms that this kind of extension takes
place spontaneously:
MS 11.1.71: vidhir iti cen na vartamānāpadeśāt |
[If one says] “It is an injunction”, [the answer] is “No, because that is
[merely] the statement of how things go”.
In the fairly long previous discussion, the joint/simultaneous performance (yau-
gapadyam) of several subsidiaries is said to be the rule, provided that it
complies with some simple principles:
22 Incidentally, in grammar, headings are often [parts of] operational rules.
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MS 11.1.68: vyākhyātaṃ tulyānām yaugapadyam agṛhyamāṇaviśeṣāṇām |
It has [already] been explained that there should be a joint/simultaneous
performance of [several] comparable [subsidiaries] among which no dis-
tinction is perceived.
MS 11.1.69: bhedas tu kālabhedāc codanāvyavāyāt syād viśiṣṭānāṃ vidhiḥ
pradhānakālatvāt |
But they should be separate when their time is separate or their injunc-
tions are not joined, and there should be an injunction of the distinct
[subsidiaries] because time is the prevalent concern.
Some points of this discussion may throw light on Pāṇini’s ancillary devices; in
particular, what both texts seem to share is the perception of the natural
capacity of some rules/actions to be assigned to other rules/actions, thereby
expanding their scope from the single expressly denoted element to a whole
context through a sort of radial process. They also commonly share the need to
take the natural boundaries of such an expansion into account – boundaries
created by sameness of context – and, to consider the provisions to overcome
them. Typically, this is done in the case of headings that extend the natural
mechanism of anuvṛtti outside the proper context. What, on the other hand, is
not found either in Pāṇini or in ritualistic literature, is the need to distinguish
sharply between a mechanism of extension in praesentia and one in absentia.
This need will develop later on with the distinction between tantra and prasaṅga
extension devices,23 and between adhikāras proper on the one hand and nam-
ing/interpretation rules on the other.
In fact, a first sharp division between these two devices is proposed for the
first time in grammatical tradition by Patañjali while discussing the status of the
meta-rule A 2.1.1 samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ:24
23 These two technical devices with the history of the relevant terminology are focused on in
Freschi/Pontillo 2013 and 2013a.
24 This rule is commonly interpreted as “A provision concerning inflected words [is said] of
words having semantic and syntactic connection (samartha)”. Cf. Cardona (1997: 66): “An
operation pertaining to padas applies to padas that are syntactically and semantically related.”
Its range of application traditionally includes all compounds or even all five types of vṛtti (i. e.
primary and secondary derivative nominal stems, compounds, derivative verbal base forma-
tions, and the so-called ekaśeṣas). Recently (Pontillo 2013: 113–120) the following fresh inter-
pretation has been submitted: “A provision which mentions (involves/depends on) inflected
words denotes the same object [of the output of rule],” partly based on a previous analysis of all
the A occurrences of the noun vidhi used as a second constituent of a compound, presented in
Candotti/Pontillo forthcoming: § 5. Accordingly, moving from the everyday linguistic setting to
the metalinguistic one, the target of this rule becomes the equivalence of the denotation taught
by the formation-rule and the output of the formation itself, i. e. between the vigraha enunciated
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M 1.358 ll. 3–7: kiṃ punar ayam adhikāra āhosvit paribhāṣā | kaḥ punar
adhikāraparibhāṣāyor viśeṣaḥ | adhikāraḥ pratiyogaṃ tasyānirdeśārtha iti
yoge yoga upatiṣṭhate | paribhāṣā punar ekadeśasthā satī sarvaṃ śāstram
abhijvalayati pradīpavat | tad yathā | pradīpaḥ suprajvalita ekadeśasthaḥ
sarvaṃ veśmābhijvalayati |
What [kind of rule] is this? A heading or an interpretation-rule (paribhāṣā)? –
But what difference is there between a heading and an interpretation-rule? –
A heading stands by the side of every rule, so that it may not be specifically
mentioned at each rule. On the other hand, an interpretation-rule illuminates
the whole corpus of rules [although] located in only one place like a kindled
lamp which illuminates the whole house.
Once again we find the simile of the lamp, but this time it is directly connected
with one of the two devices. The lamp becomes a metaphor for a mechanism
working in absentia, as opposed to a heading that stands by the side of each and
every rule, which is physically present, so to say.25 And this presence of the
physical/concrete dimension of language in the case of extension by heading,
i. e. the extension of a linguistic form as opposed to a more general ‘convention’
on meaning-interpretation (paribhāṣā) becomes crucial for commentators in
solving difficulties raised by the interpretation of Aṣṭādhyāyī rules, see e. g. the
following well-known passage from Patañjali:
M 1.119 ll. 9–15 ad vt 4 ad A 1.1.49: adhikāro nāma triprakāraḥ | kaścid
ekadeśasthaḥ sarvaṃ śāstram abhijvalayati yathā pradīpaḥ suprajvalitaḥ
sarvaṃ veśmābhijvalayati | aparo ’dhikāraḥ yathā rājjvāyasā vā baddhaṃ
kāṣṭham anukṛṣyate tadvad anukṛṣyate cakāreṇa | aparo ’dhikāraḥ
pratiyogaṃ tasyānirdeśārtha iti yoge yoga upatiṣṭhate |
What is called a “governing [element]” (adhikāra) is of three kinds. One of
these illuminates the whole corpus of rules [although] it is located in only
one place like a kindled lamp, which illuminates the whole house. Another
kind of adhikāra is dragged in by means of the syllable ca, like a piece of
wood, which is dragged along since it is bound by means of a rope or a
chain. Another kind of adhikāra remains present in every rule, so that it
may not be specifically mentioned in each rule.
or suggested by vṛtti-rules and the newly formed (and then inflected) pada. Thus, in whatever
operational rule, the liṅga bidding the application of this rule of equivalence might actually
consist of the presence of padas (used to condition the denotation of the relevant formations).
25 Cf. Nyāsa’s etymological explanation of the term paribhāṣā (ad A 2.1.1): parito vyāpṛtā bhāṣā
[…] “paribhāṣā is a speech which is engaged all around”.
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The aim of the passage is in itself quite straightforward: a proposal is made
(M 1.119 l. 4 vt 4 ad A 1.1.49: viśiṣṭā vā ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā) to identify substitution
genitives with a specific marker in order to differentiate between them and other
kinds of genitives. At this point an objection is raised that it would be necessary
to repeat an item in the genitive if, while recurring from one rule to another, the
meaning of the genitive changed. The objection is answered by the passage
quoted above which highlights the fact that there are three kinds of governing
elements,26 the last of which corresponds to the definition of the adhikāra
proper, or heading, which stands by the side of every rule (yoge yoga
upatiṣṭhate). This ensures the sole presence of the linguistic form, irrespective
of the meaning it conveys.27 Thus a genitive form can recur from one rule to
another while conveying the meaning of a partitive in the first rule and that of a
substitution in the second. The second case is that of an anuvṛtti managed by the
physical presence of the word ca. And the first type of rule affected is certainly
the paribhāṣā as shown by the definition and by the standard of the lamp, and
as explained by commentators.28 Thus, just as a lamp illuminates a house by
illuminating itself, in the same way a meta-rule leads to the understanding of
further rules by conveying the notion and not just the form of itself.29
26 It is evident that this three-fold adhikāra is an overarching name encompassing adhikāra
proper, ellipsis with ca and also, as we shall see, paribhāṣās. A hint that in the Aṣṭādhyāyī the
difference between the three is often blurred.
27 This third type of adhikāra seems to encompass both cases of technical headings, i. e.
originally marked with the svarita-accent and cases of anuvṛtti, i. e. of common cases of ellipsis.
By the way, there are many hints of the strictly non-technical usage and interpretation of
anuvṛtti both in Pāṇini and his commentators.
28 See Kaiyaṭa’s Pradīpa ad M ad A 1.1.49 vt 4: adhikāro nāmeti | pārārthyasāmyāt paribhāṣāpy
adhikāra ity ucyate | kaścid iti | paribhāṣārūpa ityarthaḥ “As far as ‘What is called adhikāra [by
Patañjali]’ is concerned, the meta-rules are also indicated by means of ‘adhikāra’, since they also
aim at something else (i. e. at further A sūtras). With regard to ‘kaścid’, it means ‘that which is
represented by a paribhāṣā’”. Nāgeśa, in turn, attributes the following interpretation to Kaiyaṭa:
adhikāraśabdena pārārthyāt paribhāṣāpy ucyate | kaścit paribhāṣārūpa iti kaiyaṭaḥ | dīpo yathā
prabhādvārā sarvagṛhaprakāśaka evam etatsvabuddhijananadvārā sarvaśāstropakārakam iti
tattātparyam (NPBh 3.1–3) “Kaiyaṭa maintains that paribhāṣās are also denoted by means of
the word adhikāra, because they aim at some other [rule]. One (of the three types of adhikāra,
namely the first one mentioned above) is the paribhāṣā. The intentional meaning of this is that [a
paribhāṣā] is a subsidiary for the whole (grammatical) teaching through the production of its own
notion, just as a lamp illuminates the whole house by [its] light”.
29 We also find this underlying ‘autonymic’ significance in the simile of the lamp, as shown by
other contexts where it is used. See e. g. D 1.3 ll. 19–20: […] anye manyante | dviśaktiḥ śabda
ātmaprakāśane ’rthaprakāśane ca samarthaḥ | yathā pradīpaḥ ātmānaṃ prakāśayan nidhyarthān
prakāśayatīti “Others think: the word has two powers: it is capable of manifesting itself and its
meaning. Like a lamp which while manifesting itself also manifests the riches in the treasury”. Cf.
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But how much of this distinction reconstructed by the commentators can
be safely attributed to Pāṇini? As we have said, the situation seems blurred
and the lengthy commentarial discussions on the status of some rules (A 2.1.1
as already seen, but also A 1.1.3) clearly show that commentators felt the
need to create some order and give a clearer categorization to those devices
whose different features and functions are mostly left implicit by Pāṇini. In
fact, Pāṇini seems, at the very least, uninterested in such a distinction, an
attitude that he appears to share with other technical traditions. At least from
the terminological point of view, there is no occurrence of the term paribhāṣā
in Śrauta-sūtras (see Chierichetti, this volume). Moreover, the only occurrence
of the term adhikāra we have singled out in the same literature is included at
the beginning of the KŚrS. Here ability/legitimacy to perform the Vedic rites
is discussed and finally restricted on the basis of varṇa and other specific
conditions: 1.1.1–4 athāto ‘dhikāraḥ | phalayuktāni karmāṇi | sarveṣām
aviśeṣāt | manuṣyāṇām vārambhasāmarthyāt “From here onward [we shall
explain] the entitlement [of performers]. Ritual actions are [all] essentially
connected with the [achievement of] a result. The entitlement [to perform
these ritual actions] belongs to all because there is no difference [as far as
the results of ritual actions are concerned]. Or rather, [the entitlement only
belongs] to human beings because of their ability to undertake [the perfor-
mance of rites]”.30 It is self-evident that this kind of usage of the term
adhikāra does not concern a category of rules, but rather a classification of
eligible performers of sacrifices. What can be considered as shared by gram-
matical and ritual adhikāras is their being fit to undertake specific opera-
Mīmāṃsā-commentary by Śabara (ad MS 1.1.5), where the argument is put into the opponent’s
mouth – merely in the sense that even the siddhāntin cannot deny the fact that a cognition while
making the other objects known must itself be known: utpadyamānaivāsau jñāyate jñāpayati
cārthāntaraṃ pradīpava “(Is it not a fact that) it ( = the cognition) becomes known, while it comes
into existence and at the same time it makes the other objects known, as a lamp does (which is itself
seen and renders other things visible?”. Cf. Nyāyasūtra 5.1.10: pradīpopādānaprasaṅganivṛttivat
tadvinivṛttiḥ “As it is not necessary to bring a (second) lamp to see the (first) lamp (which people
who desire to see things bring to see them), in the same way, it is not necessary for the instance
(which is stated in order to make known a thing that is not known)”.
30 This meaning is close to that in MS 6.1.4: phalārthatvāt karmaṇaḥ śāstraṃ sarvādhikāraṃ
syāt “The entitlement [to perform] that ( = the ritual action) which is taught should belong to all
beings, because the ritual action is targeted on its results”, and in MS 6.2.1:
puruṣārthaikasiddhitvāt tasya tasyādhikāraḥ syāt “The entitlement to the fruits of ritual actions
should belong to each [human being], because a single end is established for human beings”.
Cf. also MS 6.6.36; 11.1.21.
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tions, i. e. their capacity to govern operative rules/ritual performances in
order to put them into effect.31
Furthermore, the fact that Pāṇini puts the majority of interpretation-rules at
the beginning of the grammatical text, thus granting them the possibility of
covering almost the whole text by anuvṛtti, is more consistent with a functioning
of interpretation-rules akin to that of natural ellipsis mechanisms and conse-
quently, closer to the functioning of headings. The times for a long discussion
on kāryakāla and yathoddeśa interpretation of the functioning of meta-rules
were yet to come. If the above is true, both interpretation rules and headings
are, from all points of view, part of the grammatical text in Pāṇini, characterised
by being subservient to other rules and by being interpreted not only on the
basis of their wording but also of the place (let us recall ekadeśastha- said by
Patañjali of interpretation rules) they occupy in the actual text.
3 Kātyāyana’s interpretative and philological
tools to establish a conclusive text
3.1 Meta-rules and operational rules
From the first commentaries onwards, we concentrate mainly on interpretation
rules (paribhāṣās) since both the term and a distinctive concept seem to emerge.
Let us begin with a few lexical facts. The term paribhāṣā is far from common in
the early period of grammatical tradition. Even though it seems well-established
by the time of Patañjali, Kātyāyaṇa uses it only twice.32 It is used once with
reference to meta-rule A 1.1.69 aṇudit savarṇasya cāpratyayaḥ, which teaches
that an aṆ sound and a sound marked with U denote not only themselves but
also all homogeneous sounds. The problem that arises is what to do with
31 Cf. M 1.2 ll. 2–3: atha śabdānuśāsanam | atha iti ayam śabdaḥ adhikārārthaḥ prayujyate |
śabdānuśāsanam śāstram adhikṛtam veditavyam “Here is the teaching of linguistic forms. This
word atha is used in the sense of ‘appointing’. The treatise which teaches the linguistic forms
has to be recognized as appointed”.
32 In addition to these two occurrences, we find a gerundive form from the verbal stem pari-
bhāṣ- used by Kātyāyana in the same context (A 1.1.69): vt 7 savarṇe ’ṇgrahaṇam aparibhāṣyam
ākṛtigrahanāt “In the notation of homogeneous sounds there is no need to specify the compre-
hension of the aṆ sounds because of the comprehension of the generic form”. On the other
hand, Abhyankar (1967: 6) recenses more than 40 vārttikas he considers as paribhāṣās.
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sounds, in particular, vocalic sounds, which are not directly mentioned33 but
indicated through the sounds in the list of sounds (akṣarasamāmnāya), in their
turn, denoted by their condensed forms (pratyāhāra).34 In fact, no long vowels
are mentioned in the list, nor can we say (vt 3) that the sounds in the list can
denote something in their turn: they are objects denoted and not words denot-
ing, and nothing can change this intrinsic nature of theirs.35 Nor it is possible to
state (vt 4) that the teaching is imparted in the initial sound-list itself, because
the meta-rule is both actually and logically subsequent36 to the list:
vt 4: varṇapāṭha upadeśe iti ced avarakālatvāt paribhāṣāyā anupadeśaḥ |
If one says that the reading of sounds is made in the first teaching, then
there can be no first teaching of a specification/commentary (paribhāṣā),
because it is subsequent.
In this passage, the function of regulating, i. e. commenting on another rule,
proper to the pari-bhāṣā, is crucial for logical reasoning: the meta-rule presup-
poses another rule, it cannot be a ‘first teaching’.
The second occurrence is found in the comment on A 1.3.11
svaritenādhikāraḥ, the meta-rule teaching that adhikāras ‘headings’ are marked
in the Aṣṭādhyāyī with a svarita accent. Now, as vt 2 points out, what is explicitly
stated (nirdiśyamāna) is assigned to the entire communicative event in everyday
practice (loke) too.37 Moreover, another explicit statement would block a pre-
viously affected statement in ordinary language and this is not desired for
headings in grammar:
33 e. g. A 7.4.32 asya cvau “[Long vowel i] replaces a when it is [the final sound of a pre-affixal
base] before the affix Cvi”, is applied both to a and ā.
34 Condensed forms are taught by A 1.1.72 to denote the sounds in the list. Sounds of the object
language are only secondarily hinted at by condensed forms.
35 vt 3 hrasvasampratyayāt iti cet uccāryamāṇasampratyāyakatvāt śabdasya avacanam.
36 Cf. Patañjali’s commentary thereon (M 1.178 ll. 23–26 ad A 1.1.69 vt 4: kiṃ parā sūtrāt kriyata
iti ato ’varakālā | neti āha | sarvathāvarakālaiva | varṇānām upadeśas tāvat |
upadeśottarakāletsaṃjñā | itsaṃjñottarakāla ādir antyena saha itā iti pratyāhāraḥ “– Does it
come later than this, since it is considered as subsequent with respect to the [relevant sūtra]
(i. e. with respect to the akṣarasamāmnāya-sūtras)? – No, the Teacher says. It comes later in any
case. First of all, there is the first teaching of sounds. After this first teaching [of sounds] there is
the saṃjñā it. Then there is the pratyāhāra consisting of the initial sound with the final marker
according to rule A 1.1.71”.
37 vt 2 na vā nirdiśyamānādhikṛtatvād yathā loke. Patañjali gives the following example: one
can say “let a cow be given to Devadatta, one to Yajñadatta and one to Viṣṇumitra” and a cow
is also attributed to Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra.
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vt 3: anyanirdeśaḥ tu nivartakaḥ tasmāt paribhāṣā |
But a different explicit statement will block it, for which reason there is the
meta-rule/specification.38
Another vt will be mentioned here. Even though Kātyāyana does not clearly
identify a class of meta-rules (still less a class of interpretation rules) as opposed
to operational rules, he does not hint at the existence of a function that differs
from the one – commonly attributed to operational rules – of bringing about
(nir-vṛt-) linguistic elements. The vt in question tackles the problem of the meta-
rule A 1.1.50 sthāne ’ntaratamaḥ “In the place of [something] there is the nearest
one”, which specifies the mechanism of substitution by clarifying that, when
more than one substitute is applicable to a substituend, one must choose the
one most similar to it. Now, one needs to understand what exactly A 1.1.50 does:
vt 2: sthāne ’ntaratamanirvartake sthāninivṛttiḥ |
If [it is a rule that] brings about the most similar [substitute] in that place,
then the place-holder would be excluded.39
That is to say, if A 1.1.50 is interpreted as an operational rule teaching that any
linguistic form be substituted by its most similar substitute, there would be no
place for any substituend whatsoever. Yet, the converse option also sparks some
difficulties:
vt 3: nirvṛttapratipattau nirvṛttiḥ |
If there is perception of [substitutes] which have already taken place, then
they have [already] taken place,40
38 Let us imagine a sentence such as “let a cow be given to Devadatta, a blanket to Yajñadatta
and one to Viṣṇumitra”.
39 Cf. Filliozat’s (1976: 389) translation: “Si ‘sthāne ‘ntaratamaḥ’ est producteur, il y a éviction
des originaux”. That seems to be fairly close to Patañjali’s commentary (M 1.122 ll. 4–6 ad A
1.1.50 vt 2: sthāne ’ntaratamanirvartake sarvasthānināṃ prāpnoti | asyāpi prāpnoti | dadhi madhu
| astu | na kaścid anya ādeśaḥ pratinirdiśyate tatrāntaryato dadhiśabdasya dadhiśabda eva
madhuśabdasya madhuśabda evādeśo bhaviṣyati “If [it is a rule that] brings about [the sub-
stitutes] most similar in the place, then there the withdrawal of all the place-holders will be
obtained. [The withdrawal] of this will also be obtained. Take for example dadhi madhu. Let it
be so! No other substitute is referred back. In this case, on the basis of the similarity, the
linguistic form dadhi will replace the linguistic form dadhi, the linguistic form madhu will
replace the linguistic form madhu”.
40 Cf. Filliozat’s (1976: 389) translation: “S’il y a par la présente formule compréhension
d’éléments produits par une autre, la production ne se réalise pas.”
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and (vt 4), if the production of the substitutes has already been accomplis-
hed, the rule is purposeless. Finally, with vt 5, Kātyāyana returns to a
previous solution, namely that of putting the rule under the governing
element ‘ṣaṣṭhī’ in A 1.1.49, thus meaning that the most similar substitute
takes the place of something expressed with a genitive ending. What is
relevant here is how Kātyāyana continuously evokes the distinction between
an injunctive rule and a meta-rule paribhāṣā without however ever focusing
on it clearly, through the opposition of “a rule bringing about the substitute”
(i. e. an operational rule) and a rule leading to “a [specific] comprehension
concerning substitutes already realized”. In this sense, such an understand-
ing can be safely declared useless for obtaining the right substitute forms (vt
4). Likewise, the final solution of linking 1.1.50 with ‘ṣaṣṭhī’ quoted in the
immediately preceding paribhāṣā helps in reading the whole set of rules
1.1.49–50 as a paribhāṣā-provision. This, however, is not the specific point
of the vt which aims, rather, at limiting the rule’s scope to rules involving a
substitution genitive.41
3.2 Jñāpaka
To close our survey on Kātyāyaṇa’s usage of later well-established technical
terms in the field of discussion on meta-rules, we must also quickly tackle his
usage of the well-known term jñāpaka, the ‘indication’ that in latter texts
proves both the existence of the interpretative principle and the superfluity
of enunciating it explicitly. Occurrences of the derivates of the causative base
jñāp- in Kātyāyana are scanty, ten times in all in the vārttikas, among which
we must consider 2 occurrences in ślokavārttikas42 and 2 occurrences of non-
technical verbal forms of jñāp-.43 This leaves us with a core set of six
occurrences.44
What is particularly interesting is that in these passages, all dealing with
proposed integrations or particular interpretations of the text, Kātyāyaṇa never
says that the jñāpaka allows the desired integration/interpretation not to be
41 Again, what is only confusedly hinted at by Kātyāyana is, on the contrary, explicated and
systematized by Patañjali who glosses nirvartaka with ‘antaratamā anena nirvartyante’ (M 1.122
l. 1 ad A 1.1.50 vt 1) and nirvṛttapratipatti with pratipādaka- further explaining it as anyena
nirvṛttānām anena pratipattiḥ (M 1.122 ll. 9–10 ad A 1.1.50 vt 2).
42 M 1.73 ll. 15–18 ad A 1.1.19 vt 2; 1.200 ll. 21–24 ad A 1.2.18 vt 2.
43 M 1.259 l. 8 vt 13 ad A 1.3.1; M 1.261 l.16 vt 3 ad A 1.3.1.
44 M 1.67 l. 18 vt 5 ad A 1.1.11; M 1.111 l. 14 vt 3 ad A 1.1.45; M 1.155 l. 14 vt 3 ad A 1.1.59; M 1.156
l. 23 vt 8 ad A 1.1.59; M 1.209 l. 22 vt 5 ad A 1.2.32; M 1.349 l. 17 vt 3 ad A 1.4.99.
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stated aloud. It is difficult to consider this as incidental because, as we shall see
later, Kātyāyaṇa does, whenever needed, explicitly state on what grounds he
considers that a given principle may remain implicit; see for example, the fixed
statement avacanāt lokavijñānāt siddham “This is established because what is
not stated explicitly is known from mundane usage”.45 On the other hand, the
thinking behind a jñāpaka is much more oriented towards the need to prove
Pāṇinian authority for a proposed integration or interpretation:
1. A 1.1.11 īdūded dvivacanaṃ pragṛhyam provides the name pragṛhya for words
ending with ī, ū and e when they are dual endings. vt 4 calls attention to the
fact that, if we interpret the rule as targeting words ending with ī, ū and e
and with dual endings, it is necessary to make an explicit prohibition for
cases with a zeroing of dual endings. This avoids using the name pragṛhya
for forms such as kumārī agāram with zero substitution of the dual ending
( < kumāryor agāram) taught by A 7.1.39.46 vt 5 then states: saptamyām
arthagrahaṇaṃ jñāpakaṃ pratyayalakṣaṇapratiṣedhasya “The mention of
meaning in the seventh ending is a clue of the prohibition of rule A 1.1.62
[in the case of the name pragṛhya]”. The reference here is to rule A 1.1.19
īdūtau ca saptamyarthe which teaches that words ending in ī and ū with the
meaning of a seventh ending [are called pragṛhya]. The mention arthe
instead of the simple seventh ending is stated as necessary in order to
take care of cases with a zeroing of the ending,47 thus showing that A
1.1.62, which grants the transference of affix-rules to the zeroed realisations
of these same affixes, does not work when dealing with the name pragṛhya.
The jñāpaka is used here to prevent a possible objection to the proposed
integration.48
2. A 1.1.45 ig yaṇaḥ saṃprasāraṇam provides the name saṃprasāraṇa for i, u and ṛ
substitutes of the respective semivowels. The problem is understanding whe-
ther this (vt 1) is a name for the sounds (which are substitutes of the semivo-
wels) or (vt 2) for the operation of replacing the semivowels with the vowels.49
45 Cf. e. g. vt 5 ad A 1.1.21; vt 2 ad A 1.1.65.
46 A 7.1.39: supāṃ sulukpūrvasavarṇāccheyāḍāḍyāyājālaḥ “Affixes named suP, when occurring
after an aṅga in the chandas are replaced with sU, LUK, a long vowel corresponding to the
preceding one, ā, āt, Śe, Ḍā, Ḍyā, yāC and āL”.
47 Where the name pragṛhya is desired, unlike in A 1.1.11.
48 Using a loose paraphrase we could say that the reasoning behind the jñāpaka is the
following: “and we cannot use the argument of transference of zeroed endings by A 1.1.62
because rule A 1.1.19 shows us that such a transference does not work in the case of the name
pragṛhya.” An explicit mention (as proposed) is thus necessary.
49 M 1.111 l. 5 vt 1 ad A 1.1.45: saṃprasāraṇasaṃjñāyāṃ vākyasaṃjñā ced varṇavidhiḥ; 1.111 l. 9
vt 2 ad A 1.1.45: varṇasaṃjñā cen nirvṛttiḥ.
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To this, vt 3 vibhaktiviśeṣanirdeśaḥ tu jñāpakaḥ ubhayasaṃjñātvasya retorts
that the explicit mention of the name saṃprasāraṇa in different endings is a
clue to the fact that it is a name for both. The jñāpaka is used here to prove a
given interpretation of the rule.
3. Two occurrences are found in one of the meta-rules managing the process of
substitution: A 1.1.59 dvirvacane ’ci teaching that “[the substitute of a vowel]
occurring immediately before (a suffix) which begins with a vowel is as if it
were the place-holder in case of reduplication.” The problem raised here is
that since the prescription of transference follows the establishment of the
reduplicated substitute, the reduplication will have the form of the substitute
itself which, in many cases, is not desired.50 vt 3 ajgrahaṇaṃ tu jñāpakaṃ
rūpasthānivadbhāvasya answers that “the mention of vowels is a clue to the
fact that there is ‘treatment as if it were the place-holder’ of the form itself”. In
fact, the restriction aci “before a suffix beginning with a vowel” is said to be
meant to block the otherwise assumed rūpasthānivadbhāva in cases such as
jeghrīyate and dedhmīyate51 (with suffix yaṄ) where a transference of the form
of the place-holder would lead to the incorrect forms *jāgrhyāte and
*dādhmīyate. In this case, the clue is found in the rule itself and is, strictly
speaking, not a redundancy (aci is not used only to debar unwanted cases of
rūpasthānivadbhāva) and it is by no means a way of avoiding the explicit
mention either of an addition or of a hermeneutical principle.
4. Nevertheless, the commentary continues, if we assume rūpasthānivadbhāva
for doubling, a problem arises for forms such as adhijage where it is
necessary to double the form of the substitute gāṄ and not of its place-
holder iṄ, and a number of other cases. As we are not interested in the
technicalities of the discussion here, it suffices to say that vt 7 proposes both
a different interpretation and an integration (vacana) of the text: dvirvaca-
nanimitte ’ci sthānivad iti ceḍ ṇau sthānivadvacanam “If [we interpret]
‘before a [suffix] beginning with a vowel that causes reduplication, [the
substitute] is treated like the place-holder’, then there should be explicit
mention of treatment like the place-holder before the affix ṆiC”. In forms
such as jijāvayiṣati (from ju + ṆiC + saN + ŚaP + tiP), saN (and not ṆiC)
triggers the doubling yet the rūpasthānivadbhāva must be granted. vt 8 oḥ
puyaṇjiṣu vacanam jñāpakam ṇau sthānivadbhāvasya closes the discussion
certifying that “the mention oḥ puyaṇjiṣu is a clue that before a Ṇi there is
50 M 1.155 l. 9 vt 1 ad A 1.1.59: ādeśe sthānivadanudeśāt tadvataḥ dvirvacanam; l. 12 vt 2:
tatrābhyāsarūpam.
51 Taught by A 3.1.22 with substitution of ī for ā by A 7.4.31.
534 Maria Piera Candotti and Tiziana Pontillo
sthānivadbhāva.”52 Here the jñāpaka plays a role more akin to the one we
are used to considering in later literature: i. e. it grants the pointlessness of
the previously proposed modification of the text.
5. Rules from A 1.2.32 to 40 teach the name ekaśruti “monotone utterance”53
and specific accent rules thereon. Now, as pointed out by vt 1 ad A 1.2.32,
some of these rules teach effects that take place after a circumflex accent
(svaritāt) and thus presuppose rule A 8.4.66 teaching the substitution of an
udātta accent (when followed by an anudātta) with a svarita. The problem is
that A 8.4.66 is supposed to be as if it were non-realised for all the rules
preceding it, and thus the rules should be enunciated later than A 8.4.66
itself.54 Nevertheless, what is proposed here is not (or at least not explicitly)
a textual shift, but rather a logical succession in rule application. vt 5 ad A
1.2.32 devabrahmaṇor anudāttavacanaṃ jñāpakam svaritād iti siddhatvasya
states “[The rule A 1.2.38] teaching the anudātta accent [in place of the
circumflex one] for the [plural vocative forms of deva- and brahman-, i. e.]
devāḥ and brahmāṇaḥ [instead of dévāḥ and bráhmāṇaḥ55] [in the
subrahmaṇyā hymns] is a clue to the fact that [A 8.4.66] is accomplished
with reference to rule [A 1.2.39]56, i. e. ‘after a circumflex’.” Without the
previous application of A 8.4.66, there would be no scope whatsoever for A
1.2.38. It is difficult here to determine whether the jñāpaka proves the
correctness of the proposed interpretation or grants the non-necessity of
its explicit mention. Nonetheless, the former interpretation seems to be more
probable, since elsewhere Kātyāyaṇa explicitly states the second interpreta-
tion (cf. vt 9 ad A 1.1.65, below).
6. The rule 1.4.99 laḥ parasmaipadam gives the name parasmaipada to the
abstract verbal ending la. Yet, as the first vt points out, it is necessary to
ensure that the name for any single concrete verbal ending acting as a
substitute for abstract ones is understood (grahaṇa). In fact, where it is
52 Rule A 7.4.80 oḥ puyaṇjy apare teaches the vowel i as the substitute of the vowel u (of any
length) of the reduplicative syllable before [a base] beginning with any labial consonant, any
semivowel or the consonant j- followed by a before the desiderative affix saN. Now the only
possibility for a base with a vowel a to have a reduplication syllable in u is on the basis of the
rūpasthānivadbhāva of a place-holder in u.
53 ekaśruti is a monotone utterance for calling someone from a distance according to A 1.2.33
ekaśruti dūrāt sambuddhau.
54 M 1.209 ll. 5–6 vt 1 ad A 1.2.32: svaritasyārdhahrasvodāttāt ā udāttasvaritaparasya
sannatarāt ūrdhvam udāttād anudāttasya svaritāt kāryaṃ svaritāt iti siddhyartham.
55 The initial udātta-pitch is taught by A 6.1.195: āmantritasya ca “The initial of the address
form (i. e. the vocative expression) is also udātta-pitched”.
56 A 1.2.39: svaritāt saṃhitāyām anudāttānām.
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actually taught (vacana), the name is superseded by the names of the
triplets of endings taught by a subsequent rule (A 1.4.101), as established
for the ekasaṃjñā section.57 Then vt 3 closes the discussion:
vt 3: sici vṛddhau tu parasmaipadagrahaṇaṃ jñāpakaṃ
puruṣābādhakatvasya |
But the understanding of the term parasmaipada in the rule teaching
vṛddhi before the aorist affix siC58 is a clue to the fact that the name of
the person does not block [the name parasmaipada].
In this case, the clue actually seems to be an alternative to something else being
introduced by the oppositive particle tu. On the other hand, it is not opposed to
a concrete proposal of textual addition, as any text-addition in the ekasaṃjñā
section would be blocked by the name of the person.
To sum up, we can say there are only scanty traces in Kātyāyaṇa of what
will later become a strict terminological system. In particular, there seems to be
no evidence of the specific role played by the jñāpaka in later times, namely that
of a substitution for the full textual addition;59 on the contrary, in most cases
jñāpaka could also be proof of the soundness of the proposed integration or
interpretation.
3.3 Vacana
Most often, when reference is made to what we would call a paribhāṣā,
Kātyāyana uses the term vacana ‘[explicit] statement’ (e. g. M 1.161 l. 16 vt 1 ad
A 1.1.62 pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇavacanaṃ sad anvākhyānāt śāstrasya; M
2.386 l. 3 vt 3 ad A 5.2.59 svam rūpam śabdasya aśabdasaṃjñā iti vacanāt). Now,
vacana is a generic term used by Kātyāyana in a wide range of situations that go
far beyond the limited domain of meta-rules. The term is also used to make
reference to:
(a) injunctive rules (e. g. vt 3 ad A 2.1.24 whereby ahine
dvitīyāsvaravacanānarthakyaṃ ca reference is made to accent-teaching
rule A 6.2.47 ahine dvitiyā).
57 M 1.349 l. 11 vt 1 ad A 1.4.99: lādeśe parasmaipadagrahaṇaṃ puruṣabādhitatvāt; M 1.349 l. 13
vt 2 ad A 1.4.99: iha vacane hi saṃjñābādhanam.
58 A 7.2.1 sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadeṣu “vṛddhi, [in place of the vowels i, u, ṛ, ḷ final of a verbal
pre-suffixal base] before the aorist suffix siC co-occurring with parasmaipada endings”.
59 See for example, the translation ‘intimation’ consistently used by Wujastyk.
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(b) sub-segments of injunctive rules (e. g. M 3.170 l. 14 vt 1 ad A 6.3.79, where the
part of the text ‘granthānta-’ is said to be purposeless: granthānte
vacanānarthakyam avyayībhāvena kṛtatvāt | granthānte vacanam anarthakam).
(c) proposed rules/proposed adjunctions or complements to rules (e. g. M 1.207
l. 12 vt 2 ad A 1.2.29–30 siddhaṃ tu samānaprakramavacanāt where it is
taught that the definition rules uccair udāttaḥ | nīcair anudāttaḥ are to be
completed by samānaprakrame “in the same place of articulation”, in order
to account for the fact that different vowels with different points of articula-
tion also have a different elevation).60
There are some common points in many of these passages showing the term
vacana. In many of them Kātyāyana is generally considering the necessity/
appropriateness of some explicit teaching as opposed to an implicit one, or as
compared to something to be discarded from or emendated in the text. In fact,
we can reconstruct the different steps of Kātyāyana’s reasoning to prove the
necessity of enunciating a given norm explicitly, and such steps are common to
both rules and meta-rules.
3.3.1 Avacana
A rule must be spelt out if, and only if, it is absolutely necessary. This is the
axiom on which the interpretation of any rule whatsoever in the Aṣṭādhyāyī is
founded. Many passages with vacana are concerned with what would happen if
the rule were not stated aloud.
For example, let us analyse, Kātyāyana’s vts. on the rule A 2.4.79
tanādibhyas tathāsoḥ “Optionally [zero by LUK in place of sIC] after verbal
bases of the group beginning with tanU when the affixes -ta (3rd sing. Ā) and
-thās (2nd sing. Ā) follow.”61 Kātyāyana is not satisfied with the formulation of
this rule, particularly with the ambiguous mention ta, which is both a 3rd sing.
Ā and a 2nd plural P with regard to the secondary endings. In the first two vts.,
he proposes the integration of either a mention of ātmanepada62 or of ekavacana
(singular):63 each one of these two mentions would suffice for ruling the 2nd
60 Patañjali glosses all these proposals of integrations by iti vaktavyam.
61 The rule must account for the following forms atata/ataniṣṭa “he extended”; atathās/
ataniṣṭhās “you extended”.
62 M 1.495 l. 17 vt 1 ad A 2.4.79: tathāsor ātmanepadavacanam “As far as the [endings] -ta and
-thās are concerned, the [restrictive] mention of the ātmanepada [has to be added]”.
63 M 1.495 l. 19 vt 2 ad A 2.4.79: ekavacanagrahaṇaṃ vā “Otherwise the [restriction to the]
singular has to be understood”.
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plural P out of the picture. Kātyāyana then closes the argument with a third and
last vt stating that if the explicit integration is not carried out (avacane),
undesired results could be obtained:
M 1.496 l. 1 vt 3 ad A 2.4.79: avacane hi aniṣṭaprasaṅgaḥ |
If it is not stated, there is an automatic involvement of something not
desired.
Thus, Kātyāyana accepts the explicit integration of either ātmanepada or eka-
vacana to the wording of A 2.4.79. On the contrary, Patañjali, as he often does,
goes one step further and tries to demonstrate that such an explicit mention is
unnecessary, because the same result might be obtained by correct interpreta-
tion of the existing rule through an everyday heuristic convention, i. e. by
restricting -ta to the ending most similar to the unambiguous second-mentioned
ending -thās (2nd sing. Ā).64
Now, existing paribhāṣās or proposals of new ones are evaluated in the
same way, that is to say, by looking for the need to state them explicitly. A
classical example is that of Kātyāyana’s comment on A 1.1.50 sthāne ’ntaratamaḥ
“In the place of [something] there is the nearest one”, teaching that if more than
one substitute is available for a substituendum, one must choose the substitute
that is nearest to the substituendum:65
vt 1: sthānina ekatvanirdeṣād anekādeśanirdeṣāc ca sarvaprasaṅgas tasmāt
sthāne ’ntaratamavacanam |
There is over-application because of the mention of the place-holder as
being one, and the mention of substitutes as being more than one; that is
why there is the teaching “sthāne ’ntaratamaḥ”.
3.3.2 Prasaṅga
The similarities between operational rules and meta-rules do not stop here. None
of them, for example, is aimed at establishing some wholly new linguistic
convention. On the contrary, their explicit mention (vacana) is justified by the
64 For a discussion of Patañjali’s position, see below, section 4.
65 e. g. inA6.1.87ād guṇaḥ < Saṃhitāyāmacy ekaḥpūrvaparayoḥ > ,which teaches a guṇa vowel (i. e.
either e or o) as single substitute for both a preceding long ā and a following vowel (e. g. *tava
udakam> tavodakam ‘your water’), the pbh is necessary to substitute o for (a+ u) and e for (a+ i).
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necessity to prevent and modify a default rule that would otherwise automati-
cally apply or stigmatize an attested incorrect linguistic usage. This position is
already clearly stated in Kātyāyaṇa’s very first vt, where he says that since the
relationship between word-form and word-meaning is already established by
everyday usage, grammar is meant to teach restrictions in usage for the sake of
correct behaviour (prayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ). Thus, regarding A 1.4.21
bahuṣu bahuvacanam “plural [endings] in the meaning of many”, which is, by
the way, of questionable status, but traditionally considered a vidhisūtra,
Kātyāyana says that its mention is necessary because the rule teaching the
affixation of nominal and verbal endings is made in a general way (i. e. without
specifying which endings are used in the singular, etc.) while there are attesta-
tions of incorrect usages, such as the usage of plural for dual.66
In general, any automatic implication of a rule (or of part of a rule) in a
context different from its own is called prasaṅga, a term whose history and
implications we have analysed elsewhere.67 Good management of the principle
of automatic implication is a crucial tool for a rational and economic manage-
ment of information. It ensures the effortless application of that rule unless a
special effort is made to prevent it; to quote a well-known example, a general
rule applies automatically in its dominion except for the specific sub-domains
identified by specific rules. In the above-mentioned example, rule A 2.4.79
would automatically apply to all the available -ta endings unless a way of
limiting its scope is adopted. Now, this same term prasaṅga also comes up in
the explanation of the role played by a given paribhāṣā, as we have seen in vt 1
ad A 1.1.50 above. In Kātyāyana’s mind, the limitative action of rules – which, as
we have seen, will become a distinctive feature of paribhāṣās –is at the root of
the whole grammatical system.
This is felt to such an extent that, again as regards both rules and meta-
rules, the conditions for a rule to be legitimately spelt out are not only that it
must lead to a correct result, but also that the same result cannot in any way be
obtained without the explicit teaching of the rule: consequently, it must be
necessary in the strictest meaning of the word. Even sensible rules leading to
correct results might be denied the right to be spelt out, if the result they target
may be obtained through mundane knowledge or practice.
Particularly significant in this respect is Kātyāyana’s rejection of the purpose
attributed to rule A 2.2.30 upasarjanaṃ pūrvam “[In a compound] the upasar-
jana] comes first”. vt 1 upasarjanasya pūrvavacanaṃ paraprayoganivṛttyartham
66 M 1.322 l. 2 vt 1: suptiṅām aviśeṣavidhānād dṛṣtaviprayogatvāc ca niyamārthaṃ vacanam.
67 Candotti/Pontillo 2013: 141–147; Freschi/Pontillo 2013; Freschi/Pontillo 2013a.
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proposes that the explicit teaching of the upasarjana coming first aims at
avoiding usages where this same upasarjana is put in second position, i. e. the
aim would be to avoid forms like puruṣarājan with the meaning of rājapuruṣa.
Yet this justification for its explicit teaching is not reckoned valid:
vt 2: na vāniṣṭādarśanāt |
Or this is not [the aim] because no undesired forms are recensed.
Kātyāyana closes the discussion with a third vt that negates the necessity of the
rule to account for cases where it is not possible to recognise the upasarjana via
A 1.4.23,68 thus de facto rejecting the rule itself as purposeless.69
The same pattern of reasoning is sometimes used to reject previously sug-
gested integrations into the text. If it can be proved that the integration does not
add any new benefit that cannot be obtained through correct interpretation of
the original text, then the integration is discarded. An interesting example can
be found in Kātyāyana’s discussion on rule A 1.1.65 alo ’ntyāt pūrva upadhā
which defines the technical term upadhā (roughly speaking the penultimate
sound of a given linguistic unit) either as the sound before the final part or as
the part before a final sound.70 After a failed attempt to make the second option
work through A 1.1.72 yena vidhis tadantasya, Kātyāyana proposes modifying the
wording of the rule so as to make it clear that both the penultimate and the final
unit must consist of one single sound.
68 M 1.435 l. 14 vt 3 ad A 2.2.30: ṣaṣthyantayoḥ samāse ’rthabhedāt pradhānasya apūrvanipātaḥ
“Even in a compound of two [padas] ending in the sixth vibhakti, the main [pada] cannot be the
first constituent, since it determines no difference in the meaning [of the upasarjana] (viceversa
the upasarjana differentiates the pradhāna-pada from all others)”.
69 By contrast, Patañjali does not reject this rule, which he justifies in the following way:
ṣaṣthyantayoḥ samāse ’rthabhedāt pradhānasya apūrvanipāto na bhaviṣyati | evaṃ na cedam
kṛtaṃ bhavaty upasarjanaṃ pūrvam ity arthaś cābhinna iti kṛtvā pradhānasya pūrvanipāto na
bhaviṣyati “Even in a compound of two [padas] ending in the sixth vibhakti, the main [pada]
cannot be the first constituent, since it determines no difference in the meaning: this shall not
be [accepted]. This should not be done: rule A 2.2.30 upasarjanaṃ pūrvam has to be uttered.
Nonetheless, if it is not considered able to determine a difference in the meaning, the main
[pada] shall not be the first constituent”.
70 As proposed respectively by vt 1 and vt 2. In the first interpretation it is not possible to rule
out the undesired possibility that one single sound precedes a unit made up of more than one
sound. In the second, the unit preceding the last sound might be formed by more than one
single sound.
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vt 8: alaḥ antyāt pūrvaḥ al upadhā iti vā |
Or [one should say…] the sound before a final sound is called upadhā.
Is it necessary to integrate the text in such a way? Kātyāyana’s answer is that the
integration is unnecessary because the correct meaning of the sentence is
obtained simply by interpreting it in the way one would interpret a common
language sentence:
vt 9: avacanād lokavijñānād siddham |
This is obtained even if it is not stated explicitly because of knowledge
from mundane usage.
e. g. as in the example given by Patañjali thereon, amīṣāṃ brāhmaṇānām antyāt
pūrvaḥ ānīyatām “among these Brahmins, bring here the one before the last”.
The same line of reasoning is also applied to check the legitimacy of
explicit Pāṇinian paribhāṣās. We can briefly recall here the long discussion
on the aim of A 1.1.68 svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā where any attempt
at interpretation is discarded on the basis of the fact that every time there is
proof that the result can be obtained without having recourse to the
paribhāṣā (vt 1–4). The pbh’s right to exist is finally recognised but only to
deal with a limited range of examples, the others being accounted for without
any need for its use.71
We have already seen one major reason leading to the non-necessity of
teaching a given paribhāṣā, and this lies in the fact that the interpretation-rule
is naturally accepted by common practice, and thus no further limitation to
this mundane way of acting is needed. Let us follow Kātyāyana’s line of
reasoning in evaluating A 1.1.21 ādyantavad ekasmin “In the case of one, it is
as if it were the beginning and the end”, a meta-rule teaching that expressions
like ‘beginning with’ and ‘ending with’ can also apply to units consisting of a
single element.72 vt 1 states that the meta-rule is necessary because common
expressions like ādi and anta are used saty anyasmin “when there is something
else”. vt from 2 to 4 discuss the appropriateness of substituting the original
meta-rule with a more general principle, that of extending a specific designa-
tion (vyapadeśivadbhāva). vt 5 then states that such an explicit teaching is not
necessary:
71 See Candotti 2006: 108–121.
72 e. g. the monosyllabic verbal base i qualifies both for the description of “verbal bases
beginning with i” and of the description of “verbal bases ending with i”.
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M 1.77 l. 10 vt 5 ad A 1.1.21: avacanād lokavijñānād siddham |
This is obtained even if it is not explicitly stated because of knowledge
from mundane usage.73
The same formulaic statement used to check the legitimacy of a proposed
addition to the text is used here to check the validity of a rule.
vt 6 then closes the discussion pointing out how a single sound can still be
said to be the beginning or the end of a given unit simply because there is
nothing before it or nothing after, even though nothing but the element itself
constitutes the unit:
M 1.78 l. 25 vt 6 ad A 1.1.21: apūrvānuttaralakṣaṇatvād ādyantayoḥ siddham
ekasmin |
Owing to its feature of not having anything before or after, the attribution
of “initial” and “final” is realised in the case of one.
From vt 7 onwards, Kātyāyana changes subject and looks for the prayojana of
the meta-rule. One must thus conclude that, as regards the need of explicitly
mentioning the meta-rule, Kātyāyana considers that it is possible to do without
A 1.1.21 and also without the implicit principle of extension of a specific designa-
tion (vyāpadeśivadbhāva).
What catches one’s attention in the preceding examples is that Kātyāyana
processes rules and meta-rules in the same way: in both cases he questions the
necessity of the principle and also the compelling need to state it aloud. Some
rules and/or some integrations or emendations are necessary and, at the same
time, must be stated aloud (such as ātmanepada in 2.4.79 or the meta-rule 1.1.50
discussed above). Others, though necessary, may remain implicit (such as the
emendation of al in A 1.1.65 or the principle of extension of a specific designa-
tion in A 1.1.21). In these cases the necessity of being ‘explicit statements’
(vacana) of those preliminarily accepted rules or parts of rules is then
discarded.74 Kātyāyana’s crucial concern is rarely that of distinguishing between
73 The statement is further elucidated by Patañjali (M 1.77 ll. 11–12 ad A 1.1.21 vt 5): antareṇaiva
vacanaṃ lokavijñānāt siddham etat | tad yathā | loke śālāsamudāyo grāma iti ucyate | bhavati
caitad ekasmin api ekaśālo grāma iti | “Even without any explicit statement, this is obtained
because of knowledge from mundane usage. For example, in everyday life a collection of houses
is called a village. And this is also so in the case of one [house] only: a ‘single-house’ village.”
74 In such cases of implicit paribhāṣās, the term most commonly used by Kātyāyana is grahaṇa
making reference to a kind of understanding of meaning granted by a given principle. See, e. g.
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operational rules and meta-rules, but rather, between what must be explicitly
stated and what – at both levels – can remain implicit. Kātyāyana’s attitude is
much more akin to that of a philologist trying to establish the best possible
version of the text, than that of a commentator striving to make the most out of
the existing text. Kātyāyana does not consider the exact preservation of the
original Sanskrit text as being crucial, unlike later commentators.
4 Patañjali’s search for hints of implicit
principles in Pāṇini
4.1 Exegetic stratagems
A turning-point in this attitude to the text is already found in Patañjali, who
often tries to demonstrate that Kātyāyana’s proposed integrations are not neces-
sary or, rather, that it is not necessary to state them aloud. To prove this, he
resorts to many exegetic stratagems, some of them already used by Kātyāyana,
others that are completely new: he can derive a proposed addition element
through anuvṛtti; he can obtain the desired meaning through rule splitting
(yogavibhāga); he makes an item polysemous through praśliṣṭanirdeśa, or he
can recur to ready-made (nipātana) forms, and so on. Here we propose four
significant examples in order to show the radically different frame of reasoning
between the two commentators.
1. A 2.3.4 antarāntareṇa yukte teaches that the second ending is used to
express the object combined with the words antarā and antareṇa: the usages
targeted by this rule are forms such as antarā tvāṃ māṃ ca ‘between you
and me’. Kātyāyana’s comment on this rule consists of one single vt:
vt 1: antarāntareṇayuktānām apradhānavacanam |
With reference to the words connected with antarā and antareṇa, there
should be mention of apradhāna “not principal”.
This is necessary, Patañjali (M 1.445 l. 7 ad A 2.3.4 vt 1) says, in order to avoid
the second ending for principal elements in sentences like antarā tvāṃ māṃ ca
vt 2 ad A 3.4.77 (M 2.181 l. 13: arthavadgrahaṇāt siddham iti cen na varṇagrahaṇeṣu), vt 2 ad A
6.2.2 (M 3.123 l. 8: siddham tu lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ pratipadoktasya eva grahaṇāt), vt 4 ad A
4.1.1 (M 2.192 l. 3: ṅyābgrahaṇam anarthakam prātipadikagrahaṇe liṅgaviśiṣṭasya api grahaṇāt)
and so on.
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kamaṇḍaluḥ “between you and me, a pitcher”, as the pitcher is also between the
two persons. There seems to be no doubt that Kātyāyana considers the addition
necessary, since his comment on the rule stops here. Patañjali, on the other
hand, goes on and resorts to the implicit maxim upapadavibhakteḥ
kārakavibhaktir balīyasī “a case ending determined by a kāraka is stronger
than a case ending determined by a concomitant word” (quoted by Kātyāyana
himself on A 2.3.19 but not used here) in order to show that the addition is not
necessary.75
2. We have already seen (§ 3.3.1) Kātyāyana’s discussion on A 2.4.79
tanādibhyas tathāsoḥ that ends with his statement on the necessity of
adding the information that either the ending –ta targeted by the rules is
ātmanepada or it is singular, otherwise:
vt 3: avacane hi aniṣṭaprasaṅgaḥ |
If it is not spelt out, there is an automatic involvement of something which
is not desired,
namely the -ta 2nd plural P ending in the rule. Kātyāyana stops here with this
strong assertion of the necessity of the addition. Once again, Patañjali goes one
step further and shows that it is not necessary to spell out the addition (tat tarhi
vaktavyam | na vaktavyam) because a reasoning characterised by the usage of an
accompanying element (sahāya) suffices: since -ta and -thās are mentioned
together and -thās is unambiguously a singular Ā ending of the secondary
group, -ta is also supposed to be both singular and ātmanepada. Patañjali
recalls how this also happens in everyday communication: if someone is told
75 M 1.445 ll. 9–10 ad A 2.3.4 vt 1: tat tarhi vaktavyam | na vaktavyam | kamaṇḍalor dvitīyā
kasmān na bhavati | upapadavibhakteḥ kārakavibhaktir balīyasīti prathamā bhaviṣyati | “Then
this shall be said. It does not. How then is there no second case ending for kamaṇḍalu-? A case-
ending for a kāraka is stronger than a case ending for a concomitant word: thus the first case
ending is obtained for it (kamaṇḍalu-).” The maxim is known to Kātyāyana who quotes it in A
2.3.19 sahāyukte ’pradhāne teaching third case endings for a word in connection with saha,
meaning the agent or the most effective means, when it is not principal. He questions
apradhāne itself and proves (aided by the above-mentioned maxim) that it is not necessary to
state it explicitly (M 1.453 ll. 3–4 vt 1 ad A 2.3.19): sahayukte ’pradhānavacanam anarthakam
upapadavibhakteḥ kārakavibhaktibāliyastvād anyatrāpi. This is meant to account for the fact
that in syntagms such as putreṇa saha devadattaḥ (gataḥ) “Devadatta went with his son”,
Devadatta, agent of the action of going, does not take the third-ending required by saha. The
maxim in question should suffice, since the ending required by the kāraka would prevail over
the ending required by the concomitant word. Why does Kātyāyana not resort to the same
principle in A 2.3.4, and furthermore, why does he explicitly ask for the addition of apradhāne?
It seems that A 2.3.4 still teaches a kāraka-ending, and thus the maxim cannot be applied here.
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by someone else ‘of this cow, ask for the companion’, he will bring another cow
and not a horse or a donkey.76 Commentators often use this common-language
principle in order to solve difficulties, and it will later become the basis for a
paribhāṣā.77
3. A 3.1.27 kaṇḍvādibhyo yak teaches the affix yaK in the meaning of ‘being’
(bhāva)78 after bases (whether verbal or nominal) of the group beginning
with kaṇḍū-. Kātyāyana begins by stating the necessity of teaching the
optionality for these bases through explicit mention of vā:
vt 1: kaṇḍvādibhyo vāvacanam |
After the bases kaṇḍū, etc., there must be explicit mention of vā,
otherwise, verbal bases like kaṇḍū could not be used alone with that same
meaning.79
vt 2: avacane hi nityapratyayatvam |
If it is not spelt out, the suffix will be compulsory.
76 M 1.496 ll. 2–7 ad A 2.4.79 vt 3: anucyamāne hy etasmin aniṣṭaṃ prasajyeta | ataniṣṭa yūyam |
asaniṣṭa yūyam iti | tat tarhi vaktavyam | na vaktavyam | yady api tāvad ayaṃ taśabdo
dṛṣṭāpacāro ’sty ātmanepadam asty eva parasmaipadam asti ekavacanam asti bahuvacanam
ayaṃ khalu thāsśabdo ’dṛṣṭāpacāra ātmanepadam ekavacanam eva | tasyāsya ko ’nyaḥ sahāyo
bhavitum arhaty anyat ata ātmanepadād ekavacanāc ca | tad yathā | asya gor dvitīyena artha iti
gaur eva ānīyate nāœvo na gardabhaḥ | “If this mention [of ātmanepada or ekavacana] is not
made, there should be some undesired automatic involvement, e. g. ataniṣṭa yūyam ‘you (pl.)
extended ; asaniṣṭa yūyam ‘you (pl.) acquired’. Thus it has to be mentioned. – It has not to be
mentioned. Even if an improper use (apacāra) of this word-form -ta is perceived, which is really
both ātmanepada and parasmaipada and both singular and plural, the improper use of this
word-form -thās is actually not perceived: it is exclusively ātmanepada and singular. [If one
wonders] what is entitled to be a companion (sahāya) [object of the same rule], [he has to admit
that there is no] other one than an ātmanepada and singular [ending]. See, e. g. if it is said ‘this
cow needs a second one, only a cow is brought, not a horse or a donkey.”
77 See NPBh 103.
78 In accordance with A 3.1.67: sārvadhātuke yak “The affix yaK is introduced after a verbal
base before the sārvadhātuka verbal affixes [when a bhāva or a karman is denoted]” – see e. g.
ās-ya-te devadattena “Sitting is done by Devadatta =Devadatta is sitting” (bhāva); kriyate kaṭaḥ
“a mat is being made” (karman).
79 If the optionality is introduced, when the affix yaK is not introduced, the verbal bases such
as kaṇḍū can work e. g. as nominal bases (also when meaning ‘condition’) by means of the affix
KviP (A 3.2.76: <dhātoḥ kvip ca bhāve 3.3.18 kārake 3.3.19 > ) or by means of the affix KtiN
(A 3.3.94: striyām ktin < bhāve kārake 3.3.19 > ), in order to form the feminine noun kaṇḍū and
kaṇḍūti respectively which could denote both “the itching” and “that which itches”.
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Nevertheless, Patañjali questions the necessity of this addition (M 2.38 ll. 6–8):
tat tarhi vāvacanaṃ kartavyam | na kartavyam | ubhayaṃ kaṇḍvādīni
dhātavaś caiva prātipadikāni ca | ātaś cobhayaṃ kaṇḍūyatīti kriyāṃ
kurvāṇe prayujyate ’sti me kaṇḍūr iti vedanāmātrasya sāṃnidhye |
Then this explicit mention of vā must be made. – No, it must not. Those
elements beginning with kaṇḍū- are both verbal and nominal bases. And
thus both are used, kaṇḍūyati “it itches”, meaning the making of an action
and asti me kaṇḍūḥ “I have an itch” meaning the presence of the simple
sensation.
4.2 Jñāpakas
Last but not least, arguments by jñāpaka are also commonly and widely used to
avoid the need for an explicit mention. It is not possible to carry out a survey of
the occurrences here, but we can at least briefly say that the device is used by
Patañjali following strict argumentative rules and even fixed formulaic expres-
sions. In Patañjali’s view, a jñāpaka is a detail (better, a clue) consciously80
uttered by the Teacher in order to avoid explicit mention of a detail of a rule or
of an interpretive convention (tat tarhi vaktavyam | na vaktavyam), or to solve
some difficulty in the interpretation of the text (naiṣa doṣaḥ). This detail is
significant only if it can be assigned no other function than the suggestion of
the implicit element; in the contrary case (etad anyad prayojanam), the jñāpaka as
such is rejected. Moreover, to be accepted, an interpretive rule must not be made
ad hoc, i. e. it must prove useful for the interpretation of another rule as well.
Just for the sake of the example we can follow one of these discussions in
detail here. Rule A 1.1.72 yena vidhis tadantasya teaches that the word-form
through which an injunction is made is used in place of an element ending with
that form. vt 15 of Kātyāyana proposes the addition ‘tasya ca’ which means that
it is used both in place of a form ending with that form and in place of itself:
“‘And one must say and of it to account for cases such as rauṇaḥ.’81 [vt 15]
– Why should it not be effected? It will be effected after what ends in the
element according to the present rule A 1.1.72 yena vidhis tadantasya, and
80 In the relevant passages, alongside the more impersonal ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati, we also
find tad jñāpayaty ācāryaḥ.
81 A 4.2.78: roṇī “[The taddhita-affix aṆ occurs] after the nominal base roṇī, [ending in the
relevant sUP to denote the meanings listed in 4.2.67–70]” – e. g. rauṇaḥ kūpaḥ “a well built by
Roṇī”.
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after the element alone through extension of the specific designation
(vyapadeśivadbhāva). – But the extension [only] concerns what is not a
nominal base.82 – Why does the extension of designation [only] concern
what is not a nominal base? – In order that here ‘after a word ending in
-sūtra there is the suffix ṭhak’,83 or ‘after a word ending in -daśa there is
the suffix -ḍa’84, there should be no appearance [of the suffix] after the
simple base. – This is not the aim [of the axiom]. Thus [the involved rules]
will be effected through rule A 1.1.72 after what ends with the quoted form,
and by extension of the designation after the form alone. This being
effected, the Teacher, who makes mention of anta ‘end’, makes it plain
that it is only after a word ending in sūtra or dāśa. – [No], in this case it
does not receive application after that which ends in it. In fact, it has
already been said that [A 1.1.72] is prohibited in the case of [rules]
concerning compounds or affixes. Then this maxim must be stated. It
must not: one of the Teacher’s practices makes it plain that the extension
of the designation concerns elements other than nominal bases, and it is
the fact that he says ‘[the suffix] ini after the nominal base pūrva and a
base with pūrva’ (A 5.2.86–7). – This is not a clue (jñāpaka). There is
another purpose for this mention. – Which? – ‘I shall teach the [suffix]
ini after [a word] (pūrvāt) having the word pūrva (sapūrvāt)’ –Then [the
clue is the fact] that he splits the rule. Otherwise he could simply have said
pūrvāt sapūrvāt. – But must this ‘tasya ca’ only be provided for this [case
of rauṇaḥ]? – No, the Teacher answers. This ‘tasya ca’ is provided for what
has already been enumerated and for what will be, for everything.”85
82 Cf. NPBh 32: vyapadeśivadbhāvo ’prātipādikena.
83 A 4.2.60: kratūkthādisūtrāntāṭ ṭhak “The taddhita affix ṬhaK occurs after a nominal base
expressing the names of sacrifices, and after the list beginning with uktha or after a nominal
base ending in -sūtra- [provided that the derived nominal base denotes one who studies or
knows the object denoted by the nominal base]”.
84 A 5.2.45: tad asminn adhikam iti daśāntāt ḍaḥ “The taddhita affix Ḍa occurs after a nominal
base ending in –dasa, provided that the derived nominal base denotes ‘what is in excess in it’”.
85 M 1.185 l. 21 – 186 l. 9 ad A 1.1.72 vt 15: tasya ceti vaktavyam | rauṇaḥ | kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ na
sidhyati | tadantāc ca tadantavidhinā siddhaṃ kevalāc ca vyapadeśivadbhāvena |
vyapadeśivadbhāvo ’prātipadikena | kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ vyapadeśivadbhāvo ’prātipadikena |
iha sūtrāntāṭ ṭhak bhavati daśāntāḍ ḍaḥ bhavatīti kevalād utpattir mā bhūd iti | naitad asti
prayojanam | siddham atra tadantāc ca tadantavidhinā kevalāc ca vyapadeśivadbhāvena | so
’yam evaṃ siddhe sati yad antagrahaṇam karoti tat jñāpayaty ācāryaḥ sūtrāntād eva daśāntād
eveti | nātra tadantād utpattiḥ prāpnoti | idānīm eva hy uktam | samāsapratyayavidhau
pratiṣedha iti | sā tarhy eṣā paribhāṣā kartavyā | na kartavyā | ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati
vyapadeśivadbhāvo ’prātipadikeneti yad ayaṃ pūrvād iniḥ sapūrvāc ca ity āha | naitad asti
jñāpakam | asti hy anyad etasya vacane prayojanam | kim | sapūrvāt pūrvād iniṃ vakṣyāmīti |
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Thus, at the end of this long discussion, we are back at the beginning, i. e.
with the fact that the integration is necessary. In the meanwhile, we have had a
preview of all the tools at the disposal of the commentator in his endeavour to
avoid explicit mention of the rule: first of all, recourse to a mundane practice
(the extension of specific designation), nevertheless superseded by a technical
paribhāṣā stating that this extension of designation is limited to what is not a
nominal base (and consequently not applicable in the case under discussion
which is a nominal base). The legitimacy of the technical paribhāṣā is then
checked: its utility is found in the interpretation of rules such as 4.2.60 and
5.2.45,86 and the clue (or, perhaps, already the ‘intimation’ in the strict technical
meaning) of its existence lies in the otherwise futile mention of sapūrva in A
5.2.86–7. Under such circumstances, the integration remains necessary. Thus by
the time of Patañjali, the proliferation of interpretative devices had already
reached considerable dimensions.87 And far from being a confused set of ad
hoc devices to be used at will, they represent a system that had to be coherent. A
paribhāṣā may be a problem (as we have seen in the example above) as well as a
solution, and each single paribhāṣā, to be fully valid, must find its place in an
integrated Pāṇinian system of conventions.
5 Collecting, checking and classifying implicit
meta-rules
Now we shall try to see how the earlier collectors/writers of paribhāṣās and
above all the commentators of the relevant collections seem to work, by paying
attention to the specific relationship that links them to the contents of the earlier
Aṣṭādhyāyī-commentaries. To do this we focus on what seems to be the earlier
extant collection of meta-rules, i. e. the one traditionally attributed to Vyāḍi,
taking advantage of its late commentary, known as Paribhāṣāvṛtti.
We shall deliberately ignore the complex problem of the relative chronology
between Vyāḍi and Kātyāyana/Patañjali, – regarding which the introduction to
yat tarhi yogavibhāgaṃ karoti | itarathā hi pūrvāt sapūrvād inir ity eva brūyāt | kiṃ punar ayam
asyaiva śeṣas tasya ceti | nety āha | yac cānukrāntaṃ yac cānukraṃsyate sarvasyaiva śeṣas tasya
ceti |.
86 This thanks to a sub-argument showing that A 1.1.72 itself is declared (by a proposal
advanced in vt 3) not to apply to rules teaching compounds or affixation.
87 Some very interesting notes on the further history of grammatical practices of textual
criticism can be found in Radicchi 1985: esp. 87–96.
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the edition and translation of Vyāḍi’s and his commentator’s work by Wujastyk
are broadly illustrative.88 There is certainly a strong bond between the two
traditions: 27 out of the total number of 87 paribhāṣās attributed to Vyāḍi
have a parallel in several of Kātyayana’s Vārttikas. Additionally, 31 out of the
60 of Vyāḍi’s paribhāṣās, which do not match any of Kātyayana’s Vārttikas, do
at least seem to have one, or more than one Mahābhāṣya passage in common.
Yet it is difficult to determine whether we are here facing a case of direct
borrowing (and in which direction) or borrowing from a common source or
practice. We shall, instead, concentrate our efforts on understanding the ten-
dencies of the author of the Paribhāṣāvṛtti89 as compared to Kātyāyana and
Patañjali, with the aim of testing the relationship with both these supposed
source-texts, and thereby conjecturing at which fresh target he might actually
have been firing.
5.1 An example of Vyāḍi’s distance from Patañjali
For instance, Vyāḍi’s pbh 67 sarvo dvandvo vibhāṣāyaikavad bhavati “Every
dvandva optionally becomes as if it were one ( = a singular noun)”, which is a
pbh discussed by all pbh commentators90 also occurs thrice in the Mahābhāṣya
(but is never mentioned by Kātyāyana).
In his commentary on VPBh 62, 91 the Vyāḍi-commentator already shows
how a result similar to the one sought by this pbh could be obtained by applying
a yogavibhāga or rule-splitting to rule A 2.4.12. This ensures to the optionality-
expression vibhāṣā (embedded in rule A 2.4.12) to extend the singular form to
every dvandva-compound (A 2.4.2). 92
The existence of rule-splitting can then be inferred thanks to the mention of
bahuvacanasya in A 1.2.63 (tiṣya-punarvasvor nakṣatradvandve bahuvacanasya
88 Wujastyk 1993: XIII–XXVII.
89 Although the date of the commentator is only slightly less aleatory than that of the author, it
can safely be assumed that he knew both Kātyāyaṇa and Patañjali. On the other hand, he seems
to pre-date the Nyāsa and even the Kāśikā. See Wujastyk 1993: xxviii.
90 As underlined by Wujastyk (1993: 230 n. 347) – by Puruṣottamadeva, 50; Sīradeva, 16;
Nīlakaṇṭha, 22; Haribhāskara, 16; Nāgeśa, 34; Śeṣādrisudhi, 34.
91 VPBh 62 yogavibhāgād iṣṭasiddhiḥ teaches that a desired result may be obtained through the
splitting of a rule.
92 The existence of the yogavibhāga is then inferred thanks to the mention of bahuvacanasya in
A 1.2.63 (tiṣya-punarvasvor nakṣatradvandve bahuvacanasya dvivacanaṃ nityam) which speci-
fies that the compulsory substitution of a dual ending is to be understood as replacing a plural
form (and not the optionally singular dvandva-compound tiṣyapunarvasu). This rule is traditio-
nally used as a jñāpaka for VPBh 67.
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dvivacanaṃ nityam) which specifies that the compulsory substitution of a dual
ending is to be intended as replacing a plural form (and not the optionally
singular dvandva-compound tiṣyapunarvasu). The very same argument is tradi-
tionally used as a clue for VPBh 67. Nevertheless, VPBh 62 has a wider scope
than 67, particularly in the interpretation suggested by the Vyāḍi-commentator.
The commentary on VPBh 67 is restricted to the mere proposition of the clue
(jñāpaka) – drawn from rule A 3.1.100 – and of the purpose (prayojana), which
extends the singular form taught by A 2.4.12 to whatever dvandva compound is
considered as expressing a unity:
kathaṃ jñāyate | yad ayaṃ sūtre kvacid bahūnām ekavacanaṃ nipātayati
gadamadacarayama iti (A 3.1.100) | kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | yo
dvandvaikavadbhāve aparigaṇitānāṃ dvandva ekavad dṛśyate tatraiva
paribhāṣā vartate |
How is this known? Because somewhere in the corpus of rules he inciden-
tally mentions (the masculine singular dvandva) gadamadacarayamaḥ.93
What is the purpose of hinting at this [paribhāṣā]? As far as ‘the condition
of being as if it were one’ is concerned, this pbh applies exactly when a
dvandva formed by unreckoned constituents is seen to be as if it were one.
We are thus confronted with two axioms: VPBh 62 on the usage of splitting rules
and 67 on the optionality of the singular for any dvandva-compound; both
revolve around a common set of rules.
If we now turn to the possible commentarial sources of these arguments we
notice that, while VPBh 62 is never stated as such in the Mahābhāṣya, the clue
singled out in the commentary on Vyāḍi’s pbh 62 is properly explained in the
first M occurrence of VPBh 67:
M 1.232 ll. 2–6 ad A 1.2.63: bahuvacanasyeti kim artham | uditaṃ
tiṣyapunarvasu | kathaṃ cātraikavacanam | jātidvandva ekavad bhavatīti |
aprāṇinām iti pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti | evaṃ tarhi siddhe sati yad
bahuvacanagrahaṇaṃ karoti tajjñāpayaty ācāryaḥ sarvo dvandvo
vibhāṣāikavad bhavatīti | kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam |
bābhravaśālaṅkāyanaṃ bābhravaśālaṅkāyanā ity etat siddhaṃ bhavati |
What is the purpose of mentioning “bahuvacanasya”? – See e. g. uditaṃ
tiṣyapunarvasu “the Tiṣya and Punarvasu asterisms are rising” (singular). –
93 In A 3.1.100, i. e. Pāṇini employs a singular dvandva consisting of four constituents, which
are the verbal bases gad-, mad-, car- and yam-, instead of a plural compound (i. e. instead of an
itaretarayoga-dvandva), but not a standard neuter samāhāra-dvandva.
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How can this expression be singular? – [It is taught that] a dvandva formed
by jāti-names becomes as if it were one. – The prohibition [taught] for living
beings should apply.94 – If it is thus well established, the fact that the
Master understands “bahuvacana”, reveals that every dvandva optionally
becomes as if it were one. – What is the purpose of the indication of this
[paribhāṣā]? – The [singular dvandva] bābhravaśālaṅkāyanam in the sense
of “the descendants of Babhru and the descendants of Śalaṅka” becomes
well-established.95
The question is thus evoked in Patañjali, because of the presence of the
(assumed) redundancy, i. e. the mention of bahuvacana in A 1.2.63. It answers
the question kim artham ‘what for’, a question often asked by Patañjali
concerning the specific purpose of single words mentioned in the rules and
which is not at all limited to the mentions used as jñāpakas. In the commen-
tary on A 1.2.63 itself, the same question is also asked for the words
tiṣyapunarvasvor, nakṣatre and dvandve mentioned in the rule. Furthermore,
its acting as a clue or indication is resorted to only because no other more
direct function can be attributed to it. The same paribhāṣā is merely recalled in
M 1.475, ll. 1–2 in order to solve the problem of the grammatical number of
compounds involving numerals.
Lastly, M 1.476 l. 25 – 477 l. 5 ad vt 5 ad A 2.4.12 once again involves our pbh
to comment on vt 5 (ekavacanam anarthakaṃ samāhāraikatvāt), which main-
tains that the mention of ekavacana96 is useless since a group is by itself
singular (and thus, when expressing a group, the dvandva would take a singular
ending). Patañjali rejects this vt by advancing four different purposes for the
mention of ekavacana and accepting the last one (M 1.477 ll. 4–5 ad vt 5 ad A
2.4.12). On the other hand, the first of these purposes – i. e. the fact that its
explicit mention results in the possibility of establishing that the singular is
compulsory for some elements (A 2.4.1–11), while for others (A 2.4.12–13) it is
only marginal – is rejected specifically on the grounds of VPBh 67, proven on
the grounds of A 1.2.63 commented above. All the dvandvas are hinted at by the
Teacher as being marginally used in the singular.97 Thus here, more than being
94 A 2.4.6 jātir aprāṇinām teaches that a dvandva compound denoting classes is treated as if it
were one, provided that the constituents do not denote living beings.
95 Even though it deals with the names of living beings.
96 In fact from A 2.4.1 onward, derived by anuvṛtti.
97 M 1.476 l. 25–477 l. 2 ad A 2.4.12: idaṃ tarhi prayojanam | etaj jñāsyāmīha nityo vidhir iha
vibhāṣeti | naitad asti prayojanam | ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati sarvo dvandvo vibhāṣaikavad
bhavatīti yad ayam tiṣyapunarvasvor nakṣatradvandve bahuvacanasya dvivacanạṃ, nityam ity
āha |.
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a problem-solving device, the pbh is actually a problem in itself, as it denies (at
least in a first step) the usefulness of a well-established set of Pāṇini rules.98
On the other hand, as we have seen, Vyāḍi’s commentator on VPBh 67 (and
62) merely elaborates some Patañjali arguments, but in order to focus on a
specific clue for VPBh 67, he seems to have originally singled out a noteworthy
detail of the A, i. e. the singular dvandva-compound used in A 3.1.100.
5.2 Vyāḍi’s attitude to make choices
Now we shall analyse a pbh not included in any other Collection, i. e. Vyāḍi’s
pbh 79: samudāyeṣu śabdāḥ pravṛttā avayaveṣv api vartante “Word forms
employed for whole groups are also involved in their parts”. This maxim occurs
three times in three different sections of the Mahābhāṣya. One specific couple of
examples employed by Patañjali in each of these three passages also occurs in
the Paribhāṣāvṛtti. We shall start by analysing the M source.
The first relevant M passage is included in the context of the several answers
to the general question about the meaning of the word-form vyākaraṇa, pointed
out by Patañjali in a specific section of the Paspaśā (M 1.11 l. 14 – 12 l. 27). The
proposal of vt 14 lakṣyalakṣaṇe vyākaraṇam (M 1.12 l. 15) is that “Vyākaraṇa
means both the object of a rule and the rule itself,” i. e. according to the
commentary M 1.12 l. 17 ad vt 14, the word-form vyākaraṇa might denote the
whole, consisting of both the language ruled by grammar (śabdaḥ) and the rule/
corpus of rules (sūtram) themselves.
As a possible shortcoming of this double denotation, Patañjali mentions the
difficulty of limiting the derivation of the noun vaiyākaraṇa ‘grammarian’ which
has to be connected with the single meaning of vyākaraṇa as ‘rule/corpus of
rules’ (rather than with both meanings):
M 1.12 ll. 17–18 ad vt 14: evam apy ayaṃ doṣaḥ samudāye vyākaraṇaśabdaḥ
pravṛtto ’vayave nopapadyate | sūtrāṇi cāpyadhīyāna iṣyate vaiyākaraṇa iti |
Even in this way there is this shortcoming: when the word-form vyākaraṇa
is employed to mean a whole group (i. e. both as lakṣya and as lakṣaṇa,
according to vt 14), it cannot be applied to a part (i. e. to the single
meaning of lakṣaṇa, which is the proper etymon for the noun
vaiyākaraṇa). [The noun] “grammarian” is also desired for one who
[merely] studies the rules.
98 Let us recall that this fifth vt closes the discussion as far as Kātyāyana is concerned. Thus it
might well be that this vt is the actual origin of the pbh.
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Our targeted axiom thus represents the proposal for solving the mentioned
shortcoming and some intriguing examples of its application are immediately
listed
M 1.12 ll. 18–21: naiṣa doṣaḥ | samudāyeṣu hi śabdāḥ pravṛttā avayaveṣv api
vartante | tad yathā | pūrve pañcālāḥ | uttare pañcālāḥ | tailaṃ bhuktam |
ghṛtaṃ bhuktam | śuklaḥ nīlaḥ kṛṣṇa iti | evam ayaṃ samudāye
vyākaraṇaśabdaḥ pravṛtto ’vayave ’pi vartate |
This shortcoming does not occur. Word-forms employed for whole groups
are also involved in their parts. [Let us consider] e. g. “East Pañcāla”,
“North Pañcāla”, “oil has been consumed”, “ghee has been consumed”,
“white”, “blue”, “black”.99 In this way the [questioned] word-form
“vyākaraṇa” employed to mean the whole group (i. e. both the word-
forms that are the object of the rules and the rules themselves) are also
involved to mean a part (i. e. only the rules).
However, this does not represent a definitive solution to the puzzling derivation
of vyākaraṇa, since the last alternative proposed by Patañjali aims at interpret-
ing this noun as merely designating the corpus of sūtras. Nevertheless, such a
choice raises difficulties in interpretation, accounted for through another exege-
tic maxim that sanctions the possibility for an item to be treated as if it had a
specific designation (vyapadeśivadbhāva).
The second occurrence of the mentioned pbh (with a really slight difference,
as we shall see below) is included in M 1.411 ll. 19–21 ad A 2.2.6, in the context of
the meaning of the compound a-brāhmaṇa. To understand fully the relationship
between the denotatum of the negation and that of the common noun brahmin;
Patañjali says that this last word could also denote a bunch of distinctive
features. For example, in the case of Brahmins, Patañjali proposes that asceti-
cism, learning, and birth100 be considered as distinctive features, along with
some additional ones, such as the fair complexion or clean living generally
99 All these examples are based on the opposition between the totality of an entity and some
partial component of it. A whole region is opposed to one of its geographically selected parts (or
its inhabitants taken as a whole, to a single portion of them), the whole quantity of some
viscous substance is the general reference for its mentioned portion, the general quality of a
colour is visualized as if it were a sort of deposit of all the available items marked by this colour.
100 Patañjali quotes a Smṛti-strophe about the definition of the brāhmaṇa, where precisely
these three properties, i. e. asceticism, learning and birth are required, even though a jāti-
brāhmaṇa- “a Brahmin merely by birth” (i. e. lacking in asceticism and learning) is also
admitted (M 1.411 ll. 16–17 ad A 2.2.6): tapaḥ śrutaṃ ca yoniś cety etad brāhmaṇakārakam |
tapaḥśrutābhyāṃ yo hīno jātibrāhmaṇa eva saḥ.
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associated with brahminhood.101 At this point, Patañjali reminds us of our axiom
(with the sole difference of the use of the simple participle vṛttāḥ instead of
pravṛttāḥ taken apart):
M 1.411 ll. 19 ad A 2.2.6: samudāyeṣu ca vṛttāḥ śabdā avayaveṣv api
vartante |
Word-forms utilised mean whole groups are also used to mean their parts.
and, after the same series of examples mentioned above (M 1.12) to which the
colour name kapila ‘tawny’ is added (tad yathā | pūrve pañcālāḥ | uttare
pañcālāḥ | tailaṃ bhuktam | ghṛtaṃ bhuktam | śuklaḥ nīlaḥ kapilaḥ kṛṣṇa iti),
the following sentence occurs: evam ayaṃ samudāye brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ pravṛtto
’vayaveṣv api vartate jātihīne guṇahīne ca “In this way the [questioned] word-
form ‘brāhmaṇa’ employed for the whole group (of features) is also involved in
its parts, even when devoid of [the required] birth or devoid of [distinctive]
qualities”. Thus, the negation in a-brāhmaṇa may also target one of the dis-
tinctive features102 or some commonly shared ones.103
The third M occurrence is included in the commentary on the bahuvrīhi
general rule,104 in a passage with a lengthy discussion on the analysis of the
compound ardhatṛtīyāḥ ‘two and a half’ as ardhaṃ tṛtīyam eṣām ‘the third of
them is a half’. In particular, the expression ardhatṛtīyā droṇāḥ ‘two and a half
droṇas’ (where droṇa is the well-known measurement of capacity correspond-
ing to the measure of an ordinary wooden bucket) is questioned (M 1.426 l. 27
ad vt 22 ad A 2.2.24), since the word-form droṇa is employed to mean a whole,
and therefore cannot be applied to a part (ayaṃ droṇaśabdaḥ samudāye
pravṛtto ’vayave nopapdyate). The whole passage quoted above from M 1.12
ll. 18–20 is repeated, and the series of stock examples is thus concluded: evam
ayaṃ samudāye droṇaśabdaḥ pravṛtto ’vayaveṣv api vartate “In this way the
[questioned] word-form ‘droṇa’, employed to mean the whole also occurs to
101 M 1.411 ll. 18–9 ad A 2.2.6: tathā gauraḥ śucyācāraḥ piṅgalaḥ kapilakeśa ity etān apy
abhyantarān brāhmaṇye guṇān kurvanti | “Thus they consider ‘fair-complexioned, clean-living,
ruddy-faced, brown-haired’, as nearly related properties in the Brahminhood.”
102 The example imagined by Patañjali is that of a person who is characterized by many
properties of Brahminhood (knowledge, complexion, behaviour), but is not Brahmin by birth.
103 As occurs when stating that a Brahmin who behaves inappropriately (such as eating while
walking) is a non-Brahmin.
104 A 2.2.24 anekam anyapadārthe “Two or more padas optionally combine to denote the
object of another pada (i. e. the object of a pada different from the combined padas)”.
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mean its parts”. A last provision states that this extension of meaning is
allowed, provided that it deals with parts that cannot be dissociated from the
whole.105
It is quite evident from the above that we are dealing here with a maxim
based on mundane practice and language, which Patañjali does not need to
prove, if not with some stock examples taken from everyday language. In all the
occurrences the discussion is raised only by Patañjali, and we have no clue as to
what Kātyāyana’s position would be on the problems in question.
During the first discussion, the maxim is evaluated against the axiom of the
treatment as if it were the specific designation, a principle already mentioned by
Kātyāyana, although not in this specific passage. Incidentally, the two princi-
ples, although they have some points in common,106 do not completely overlap.
Here, Vyāḍi seems to make a choice of some sort, discarding Kātyāyana’s axiom,
while simultaneously adopting an almost concurrent one, which will neverthe-
less only become part of a paribhāṣā-collection with Nāgeśa (NPBh 30). This is a
choice he also makes on other occasions, for example, when he accepts all the
paribhāṣās traditionally connected to the ekānta-view of markers and, on the
other hand, does not quote the alternative view anekāntā anubandhāḥ in his
collection.107 Furthermore, if we now turn to a couple of competing paribhāṣās –
never quoted by Kātyāyaṇa, although Patañjali mentions the first one fifteen
times and the second one once – known as kāryakāla and yathoddeśa
paribhāṣās, we again notice that Vyāḍi only records the first one. The exact
interpretation of these ‘choices’ can only come from a thorough analysis of all
Kātyāyana’s axioms (which often become paribhāṣās in later texts) and which
are not quoted by Vyāḍi: this would perhaps even enable us to provide argu-
ments regarding the dependency-relationship of the two texts.
On the other hand, what can be safely stated at the present moment is that
Vyāḍi’s attitude does not seem to be that of a collector of the traditions of his
times. He seems to make choices and aim at a coherent set of interpretative rules
tailored to match a specific text.
105 M 1.427 ll. 4–5 ad vt 22 ad A 2.2.24: keṣv avayaveṣu | yo ’vayavas taṃ samudāyaṃ na
vyabhicarati | kiṃ ca samudāyaṃ na vyabhicarati | ardhadroṇo droṇam | ardhāḍhakaṃ punar
vyabhicarati | “What kind of parts? The part that cannot be dissociated from the whole. What is
[the part] which cannot be dissociated from the whole? ardhadroṇa [cannot be dissociated] from
droṇa, while contrarywise ardhāḍhaka can be dissociated [from droṇa]”.
106 In both cases, his point is to make a word also work for denotates that do not exactly cover
the required meaning conditions.
107 “The markers are not integrated [to the word-forms they are appended to]”, matching with
NPBh 4 and already quoted by Kātyāyaṇa, such as vt 8 ad A 1.1.20.
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To return now to VPBh 79, the author of the Paribhāṣāvṛtti first limits
himself to using one of the examples occurring three times in the just-quoted
M passages: kathaṃ jnāyate | lokataḥ | tad yathā loke tailaṃ bhuktaṃ ghṛtaṃ
bhuktam iti | “How is this known? From everyday life. For instance, in the
common world one says ‘oil has been consumed, ‘ghee has been consumed’”.
But then, the already-emphasized tendency to find jñāpakas in the Aṣṭādhyāyī,
which suggests and almost certifies the existence of the supposed pbh, prevails
in the text. The locative śāstre seems to be opposed to the ablative form lokataḥ:
śāstre ’pi jñāpakaṃ yad ayaṃ vare sthānivadbhāvasya pratiṣedhaṃ śāsti |
In the corpus of rules there is also an indication, that is to say, the fact that
he ( = Pāṇini) teaches the prohibition (A 1.1.58) of the sthānivadbhāva
principle before the [affix] -vara.108
The commentator then proceeds to specify why the mention of -vara in A 1.1.58
is an indication and begins by showing that there should be no need to deny
sthānivadbhāva to account for cases of zero before the suffix -vare (except those
accounted for by the mention of ya-lopa). In fact, if we take the example
yāyāvara,109 we see that the phonic substance of intensive ārdhadhātuka affix
yaṄ is zero-replaced in two steps: firstly, a followed by any ārdhadhātuka affix
(as taught by A 6.4.48), then y in accordance with A 6.1.66 lopo vyor vali for the
phonemes v and y before any consonant excluding y. No sthānivadbhāva can
actually be resorted to in the case of zero substitute (A 6.1.66) of the consonant y
of yaṄ (because it is not the object of any exception to A 1.1.56, and it deals with
a pure alvidhi). On the other hand, the zero of a might be entitled to such a
treatment with respect to the lopa of a preceding vowel according to A 1.1.57: we
thus get a suffix that we could symbolically indicate as øyaØṄ to show the
difference between the two zeroes.
Now, another (undesired) zero replacement is taught by A 6.4.64 āto lopa iṭi
ca before an ārdhadhātuka affix beginning with a vowel: “Zero in place of the
final ā of a pre-affixal base also before [an ārdhadhātuka affix beginning with a
108 The segment vare of rule A 1.1.58 na padāntadvirvacanavareyalopasvarasavarṇānusv-
āradīrghajaœcarvidhiṣu is traditionally taken apart from yalopa from the Mahābhāṣya onward by
means of the so-called yogavibhāga-procedure. No serious justification really makes the yogavibhāga
acceptable, even though Pāṇini possibly mentions vare yalopa- “lopa of y in case of –vare”. For
Patañjali’s assumeddifficulty indealingwithphonic restrictions determinedby the involvement of the
aṅga pattern such as this one, see Candotti/Pontillo forthcoming.
109 The word-form yāyāvara- ‘one who constantly goes about, wandering (ascetic)’ is derived
by the affixation of the affix varaC after the verbal stem yā- ‘to go’ followed by the intensive
affix yaṄ applied according to A 3.2.176 (**yāyā-ya-vara) and reduplicated by A 6.1.9.
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vowel marked with K or Ṅ or] with augment iṬ).” But this would not concern the
second ā of yāyā-vara because “the status of an ārdhadhātuka is proper to the
whole [affix] yaṄ, while this (øyaØṄ) is merely a part of [the affix] yaṄ, it is not
[actually] an ārdhadhātuka. Thus, no zero-replacement of the sound ā is actually
realized. There is no scope for prohibition of the sthānivadbhāva principle”110.
Thus — and this is the conclusion of the reasoning — if Panini felt the need
to specify –vare, it is because he thought that A 6.4.64 could, undesirably, apply
in the above-mentioned case of yāyāvara-:
evaṃ siddhe sati yad varesthānivadbhāpratiṣedhaṃ śāsti taj jñāpayati
samudāyeṣu pravṛttāḥ śabdā avayaveṣv api vartante iti |
Since this is well-established in this way, his ( = Pāṇini’s) teaching a
prohibition of the sthānivadbhāva principle before the [affix] -vara makes
known that word-forms employed for whole groups are also involved in
their parts.
Thus, the commentator states that we must reckon that Pāṇini did indeed think
it possible that the expression “an ārdhadhātuka affix beginning with a vowel
marked with K or Ṅ” also denoted the affix øyaØṄ, since it is precisely A 1.1.58
which expressly prohibits it. And this is possible because Pāṇini must have had
some implicit principle in mind such as the one formalised by VPBh 79
samudāyeṣu ca vṛttāḥ śabdā avayaveṣv api vartante “Word-forms involved for
whole groups are also involved in their parts”.
The difficulty in the formation of the word yāyāvara- had already been
pointed out by Patañjali in his commentary ad A 1.1.58111 and is solved:
either by reading “vare ’yalopa” ( > vare ayalopa), i. e. sthānivadbhāva is
negated for operations concerning the lopa of a and y in case of vare,
or by splitting the rule, and thus sthānivadbhāva is negated for any
operation in case of vare and in case of lopa of ya-.
This implies that Patañjali also envisaged the risk that the suffix øyaØṄ
could be described as one of the ārdhadhātuka affixes beginning with a vowel
110 kathaṃ kṛtvā jñāpakam | iha yāyāvara iti yo ’sau yaṅo ’kāro lupto ’to lopa iti (A 6.4.48) tasya
sthānivadbhāvapratiṣedaḥ śiṣṭaḥ | ākāralopa mā bhūd iti | ārdhadhātuke ’ci kṅiti ākāralopo
vidhīyate | tatra kaḥ prasaṅgo yad uta yaṅo ’vayave ’ci lopaḥ syāt || iha yaṅaḥ
samuditasyārdhadhātuka < tva >m ayaṃ yaṅo ’vayavaḥ < na > ārdhadhātukaṃ naivākāralopaḥ
prāpnoti < nārtho > sthānivadbhāvapratiṣedhena |.
111 M 1.152 ll. 5–10.
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marked with K or Ṅ mentioned by A 6.4.64. Here Patañjali does not state on
what grounds he considers this risk possible; he could have the same principle
in mind which states that “word-forms involved for whole groups are also
involved in their parts”, which he indirectly recalls in different words, while
commenting on the general rule on substitution:
M 1.136, ll. 21–23 ad A 1.1.56 vt 11: naitan mantavyaṃ samudāya
āśrīyamāṇe ’vayave nāśrīyate iti | abhyantaro hi samudāyasyāvayavaḥ |
tad yathā | vṛkṣaḥ pracalan sahāvayavaiḥ pracalati |
Still, we should not think that when we rely on the whole, we cannot rely
on the part. A part is included in the combination. Like this: a tree when it
shakes, shakes with its parts.
But he could also implicitly refer to another well-known and partly competing
principle, the one stating that “an element that has undergone a change in one
part does not become different”. This last principle is already found in vt 10 ad A
1.1.56 ekadeśavikṛtasyānanyatvāt siddham, which rejects the proposed addition
(upasaṃkhyānam) made by vt 9 (ekadeśavikṛtasyopasaṃkhyānam), of the ‘par-
tially modified’ elements on the grounds that the partially modified elements are
not different from their unmodified counterparts.112 And this was also to become
a very well-known paribhāṣā, recorded and commented on by a number of later
collections. However, once again, it is not mentioned by Vyāḍi who, on the
contrary, is the only one to quote the aphorism samudāyeṣu ca vṛttāḥ śabdā
avayaveṣv api vartante as a paribhāṣā.113
Furthermore, Vyāḍi’s commentator concludes by looking for a purpose for
the indication of the maxim:
112 cf. M 1.136 ll. 9–10 ad A 1.1.56 vt 10: tad yathā | śvā karṇe vā pucche vā chinne śvaiva bhavati
nāśvo na gardabha iti | “Like this: when a dog has an ear or its tail cut off, it remains a dog
indeed. It does not become a horse or a donkey.”
113 As far as the specific problem of the formation of yāyāvara is concerned, we feel that a
specific provision in A 1.1.58 is not necessary. The provision taught by rule A 6.4.64 is actually
conditioned by the term aṅga, i. e. the ā which is assumed to be zero-replaced has to be the
final sound of the unit, after which the prescription mentioning the ārdhadhātuka-affix beginn-
ing with a vowel with marker Ṅ, i. e. øyaØṄ is applied. yāyā- is not the aṅga of this phantom unit
aṄ (obtained by means of such a phonic replacement), but is self-evidently the aṅga of yaṄ
according to A 3.1.22 dhātor ekāco halādeḥ kriyāsamabhihāre “[The affix yaṄ is preferably
introduced] after a monosyllabic verbal stem which begins with a consonant when the action
is repeated/intensively performed”.
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kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuka ity (1.1.4) atra
dhātvayavavalope kṛte guṇavṛddhipratiṣedhaḥ siddho bhavati |
What is the purpose in this indication? The prohibition of guṇa- and
vṛddhi-replacements by A 1.1.4 is well-established when only a part of
the verbal base is zero-replaced.
Patañjali on A 1.1.4 self-evidently interprets the bahuvrīhi dhātulopa as
referred to a partial lopa of a dhātu, as is plainly demonstrated by the examples
involved, such as loluva “who often cuts” (where a zero-replacement of the mere
intensive affix ya applies to the whole intensive verbal base lo-lū-ya-). The
problem is briefly dealt with by Kaiyaṭa:
kṛtsnasya dhātor lope guṇavṛddhiprasaṅgā ’bhāvād anarthako niṣedhaḥ
syād iti sāmarthyād dhātvekadeśalopo ’tra dhātulopo ’bhimataḥ |
If it dealt with zero-replacement of the whole verbal base, the prohibition
would be useless, because of the absence of the automatic involvement of
guṇa- and vṛddhi-substitutions: here, dhātulopa is interpreted as a partial
zero-replacement of the dhātu because the rule needs to make sense.
Thus, the commentator seems quite independent in his search for hints and
scopes of his proposed implicit meta-rules. He brings about a jñāpaka indepen-
dently from the supposed source of the axiom itself, i. e. Patañjali; moreover, the
rule-interpretation he uses as prayojana of this paribhāṣā — even though cer-
tainly implicitly accepted even by early commentators — was not linked to this
specific paribhāṣā by them, possibly because such a rule-interpretation was
reckoned as compulsory, not needing specific provision.
5.3 Looking for Vyāḍi’s target
The last example of Vyāḍi’s pbh we shall investigate is also included in all the
pbh-commentaries (Puruṣottamadeva, 86; Sīradeva, 87; Nīlakaṇṭha, 111;
Haribhāskara, 90; Nāgeśa, 111; Śeṣādrisudhi, 103).
The selected pbh is the 58th parjanyaval lakṣaṇapravṛttiḥ “The application
of rules is like the rain”. The commentary starts with an example taken from
everyday experience:
tadyathā parjanyo yāvad ūnaṃ pūrṇaṃ cābhivarṣati + nāpūrṇam
< eva > abhivarṣati + | evaṃ lakṣaṇam api bhavati | dīrghasya dīrghatvaṃ
bhavati | cicīṣati bubhūṣati |
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Thus for example a cloud/the rain falls on both that which is defective
and that which is fulfilled. It does not merely rain upon that which is not
fulfilled. A rule also behaves in this way. The long vowel replacement
[can be] proper for a [vowel which is already] long. [Compare, e. g.]
cicīṣati “he wants to pile up” [with] bubhūṣati “he wants to become”
(where, even though the middle vowel of the former verbal base, i. e. ci-,
is short, while that of the latter one, i. e. bhū-, is long, the long vowel
replacement prescribed before the desiderative affix -sa- by A 6.4.16
always applies).
Then the possible jñāpaka is highlighted:
How is this known? Because when the texts says pravāhaṇasya ḍhe ( = A
7.3.28) he teaches a prohibition114 of the first vṛddhi-replacement of the first
syllable “of the following pada” [when the taddhita-affix ḌhaK= eya fol-
lows] in the case of the word vāhana, which is already endowed with the
vṛddhi vowel. Nonetheless, the Master sees the application of the vṛddhi-
replacement even where there is [already] a vṛddhi vowel, since the appli-
cation of rules is like the rain.115
The last step consists in singling out – as usual – a specific purpose for the
paribhāṣā itself:
kim etasyā jñāpane prayojanam | khaṭvāḍhakam ity atra dīrghasyāpy akaḥ
savarṇe dīrghatvaṃ bhaviṣyati |
What is the purpose of the indication of this [paribhāṣā]? When it says
khaṭvāḍhakam (khaṭvā + āḍhakam), the replacement of an aK (a, i, u, ṛ, ḷ)116
vowel before a homogeneous vowel will apply, even though it (this aK
vowel) is already long.
The maxim analysed here is also found in Patañjali’s commentary on A 1.2.9,
where he looks for the purpose of the extension rule teaching (under some
given conditions) the affix saN as if it were marked with K (a marker that
114 For this interpretation by Vyāḍi’s commentator, see below.
115 kathaṃ jñāyate | yad ayaṃ pravāhaṇasya ḍha iti (A 7.3.28) vṛddhasyāpi vāhanaśabdasya
pūrvavṛddhipratiṣedhaṃ śāsti | paśyati tv ācāryaḥ yatrāpi vṛddhir asti tatrāpi vṛddhir bhavati |
parjanyaval lakṣaṇapravṛtteḥ |.
116 Following A 6.1.101.
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blocks the vṛddhi and guṇa replacement as taught in A 1.1.5). The technical
details of the whole section do not interest us here; suffice it to say that, while
discussing the form cicīṣati, the question is asked whether the substitution of
the final i of the verbal base with a long one taught by A 6.4.16 would not be
sufficient to block the undesired substitution of that same vowel with a guṇa-
vowel. But the answer, already anticipated by the ślvt 1 ad A 1.2.9, is that this
could not work in any way for bases whose vowels are already long: dīrghāṇāṃ
tu prasajyate “But [the guṇa-replacement] of long vowels is automatically
involved”.
What this obscure assertion exactly means is explained by Patañjali as
follows:
M 1.196 ll. 6–16 ad A 1.2.9 (ad ślvt 1): dīrghāṇāṃ tu khalu guṇaḥ prāpnoti |
nanu ca dīrghāṇām api dīrghavacanasāmarthyād guṇo na bhaviṣyati | na
dīrghāṇāṃ dīrghāḥ prāpnuvanti | kiṃ kāraṇam | na hi bhuktavān punar
bhuṅkte na ca kṛtaśmaśruḥ punaḥ śmaśrūṇi kārayati | nanu ca
punaḥpravṛttir api dṛṣṭā | bhuktavāṃś ca punar bhuṅkte kṛtaśmaśruś ca
punaḥ smaśrūṇi kārayati |
But [the guṇa-replacement] of long vowels could apply. – On account [of
being prescribed] the long-replacement (A 6.4.16) will indeed also
replace the long vowels: thus there will be no guṇa. – Long substitutes
cannot apply to long vowels. – Why? – One who has already eaten, does
not [need to] eat once again. One whose beard has been shaved, does not
[need to] shave again. – Nevertheless a new application is also seen. One
who has eaten will eat again; one whose beard has been shaved will
shave again.
Thus, reasoning only on non-technical grounds, it is difficult to establish
whether a given rule can also apply (or can apply again) where it is not
necessary. Both options seem to be available in our everyday experience.
Patañjali’s argument then resorts to the principle of sāmarthya, i. e. that a rule
must find its scope to justify its being uttered:
sāmarthyād dhi punarbhāvyam | sāmarthyāt tatra punaḥpravṛttir bhavati
bhojanaviśeṣāc chilpaviśeṣād vā | dīrghāṇāṃ punardīrghatvavacanena na
kiṃcit prayojanam asti | akṛtakāri khalv api śāstram agnivat | tad yathā |
agnir yad adagdhaṃ tad dahati || dīrghavacana etat prayojanaṃ guṇo mā
bhūd iti | kṛtakāri khalv api śāstraṃ parjanyavat | tad yathā | parjanyo
yāvad ūnaṃ pūrṇaṃ ca sarvam abhivarṣati |
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In fact a new application is due through the force of an injunction. –
Through the force of the injunction in a specific context,117 there is a new
application; because of the specific feature of food or of the specific
feature of (a barber’s) skill. – Now, there is no purpose for a new utterance
of a long-replacement of long vowels. – The treatise indeed produces that
which has not yet been produced, like fire. See, e. g., a fire that burns that
which has not been burned already. – In this rule this is [actually] the
purpose of a long-replacement [of long vowels], i. e. that a guṇa-replace-
ment can be avoided! – The treatise indeed [also] produces that which has
already been produced, like a cloud. See, e. g., a cloud that rains upon
both that which is defective and that which is fulfilled.
Thus the discussion shifts here to the interpretation of the sāmarthya of rules,
i. e. to their being effective because of being uttered. The principle, as we see
from Patañjali’s discussion, is not limited to rules teaching something new, but
also to rules that, at least in part, have no new results to boast, just like a cloud
that rains upon both that which is defective and that which is fulfilled.118 Once
again the axiom is – so to speak – only proved through parallel experience in
everyday life, and no additional clue is put forward to give more substance to
the claim that rules in grammar act as clouds.119
As far as the jñāpaka is concerned, it is noteworthy that only Patañjali and
Vyāḍi’s commentator share the quoted reading of sūtra A 7.3.28, including the
anuvṛtti of na parasya from A 7.3.27, while the rest of tradition is different.
According to Patañjali and to Vyāḍi’s commentator, on the one hand, rule A
7.3.28 teaches the optional vṛddhi-replacement of the ‘first constituent’
(pūrvapada A 7.3.19) and, on the other, it prohibits the vṛddhi-replacement of
the first syllable of the following pada (na… parasya A 7.3.27) in the compound
denoting the descendant of Pravāhana.
117 It seems that Patañjali proposes a restrictive interpretation of sāmarthya here, limiting it to
specific teachings/exceptions. Then he comes back to the more general interpretation, nearer
the position expressed by the ślvt, by which a rule acts because it is uttered, and thus in need of
a scope.
118 The discussion continues but the role of sāmarthya and the fact that in the Aṣṭādhyāyī the
rule can also apply without bringing about new results are never questioned as such.
119 The same arguments are employed in M 3.89 ll. 6–16, i. e. in the commentary on the sandhi-
rule A 6.1.127 (iko ’savarṇe śākalyasya hrasvaś ca) which teaches, in accordance with Śākalya’s
authority, that a pada-final vowel i, u, ṛ, ḷ retains its form before a non-homogeneous vowel and
is replaced by the corresponding short vowel. The replacement of a short vowel with a short
vowel through the application of this rule allows the svarasandhi to be avoided.
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As a consequence, two alternative stems are derived, i. e. prāvāhaneya and
pravāhaneya. This actually shows the application of the optionality between pra-
and prā- but not the optionality of the prohibition of the vṛddhi-replacement on
the first syllable of the second constituent, since the word vāhana is already
endowed with the vṛddhi vowel. However, the crucial point is to recognize this
latter application of the vṛddhi-replacement of the vṛddhi vowel ā, so that a further
rule (A 6.3.39) conditioned by a suffix causing a vṛddhi-replacement may apply.
In this M passage, there is no hint at the jñāpaka advanced by Vyāḍi’s
commentator for reading Pāṇini’s rules as working in a manner similar to rain-
clouds. Patañjali merely points out that if the vṛddhi-replacement of the first
syllable of the second constituent in the compound pravāhaneya is prohibited by
A 7.3.28, then according to this specific reading the taddhita -eya cannot be
considered a cause for the vrddhi-vowel of vāhaneya. As a consequence, A 6.3.39
vṛddhinimittasya ca taddhitasya araktavikāre “[A feminine nominal base 6.3.34]
ending in a taddhita-affix which determines a vṛddhi-replacement [of the initial
syllable of that base], excluding those denoting a colour or a transformation, [is
not treated like the corresponding masculine before the final constituent]”, i. e.
its prohibition is not realized. We deduce that the undesired form, which could
be automatically involved, is **pravāhaneyabharyaḥ.
Nonetheless, Patañjali does not reject the anuvṛtti of na in A 7.3.28 and resorts
to A 6.3.41 instead of 39 to get the desired feminine form pravāhaneyībhāryaḥ.
Vyāḍi’s commentator extends the assumed rain-mechanism of rule-application to
this rule. The anuvṛtti of na has no function but Vyāḍi uses it as a jñāpaka. We
wonder whether he mechanically applies a schema Patañjali uses elsewhere –
without realizing that both the prescription of the vṛddhi-replacement and its
prohibition are de facto useless from the operational point of view – or rather,
does he hint at the solution of the shortcoming temporarily assumed by Patañjali?
What does hemeanwhen he says that “theMaster sees the vṛddhi-replacement even
where there is [already] a vṛddhi vowel”? If this vṛddhi-replacement can be consi-
dered as an applied rule, the supposed shortcoming is actually solved, and as a
consequence, Vyāḍi’s pbh 58 would help to read other rules which need to be
applied, although their effect is already included in the starting point itself, in order
to realize some requirement of a further rule.
6 Conclusions
Of course, bold statements on the topics discussed so far require a thorough
analysis of all the available evidence, especially when it comes to the relationship
From Commentary to paribhāṣā 563
between Vyāḍi and the Vyāḍi-commentator and the earliest Pāṇinian tradition.
Some safe statements can, however, be put forward. First of all, right from the
beginning, implicitly by Pāṇini and then, explicitly by Kātyāyana, the basic princi-
ple founding the whole normative activity brought about by grammar is that not all
rules need to be stated, be they meta-rules or operational ones. A first, relevant,
corollary to this basic principle is that all rules are limitative by nature. The point of
many Kātyāyana’s arguments is to establish what norms are needed, and what are
not: anything that can be obtained correctly without the need of an explicit norm,
will be normed. A number of general hermeneutical rules, shared by a number of
other schools or traditions, can be obtained without any specific norm, to which the
commentator may have recourse to when necessary. This neither implies nor
negates the existence of a specific tradition of collecting and commenting on
paribhāṣās contemporary to Kātyāyaṇa, but it certainly hints at the existence of
well-grounded shared exegetical practices. On the other hand, when it comes to
more specific exegetical points, Kātyāyana takes far more liberties than later
traditions in proposing additions to the text. Some statements, later recognised as
paribhāṣās, are additions (or comments) in the vārttikas. He acts as a philologist
trying to establish a perfect text rather than as a commentator.
In Patañjali, the change of attitude is radical—and somewhat bewildering, if we
consider the short gap of time generally considered between the two authors.
Patañjali seems to deal with a huge amount of what are sometimes even contradic-
tory exegetical principles. Some may even present difficulties, since they compete
with existing paribhāṣas (as occurs for A 1.1.68 and in part also A 1.1.56), or they
create problems for proposed solutions. On the other hand, Patañjali does offer us a
first attempt at limiting some ad hoc statements or additions. He uses various
devices to avoid modifying an already fixed and inviolable text, such as indirect
indication, common everyday experience, recourse to previous parts of the text
derived by anuvṛtti, splitting of rules, condensed utterances (prasliṣṭanirdeśa).
It is against such a background that we need to evaluate the specific contribu-
tion of the first collectors and of commentators on grammatical paribhāṣās, despite
difficulties in establishing their relative chronology. What seems clear, as far as
Vyāḍi is concerned, is his intention of creating a grammar-specific exegetic manual
by selecting, among the available exegetical principles, the strictly Pāṇinian ones,
in order to create a coherent system of interpretation whose bases have still to be
studied. This attitude is reinforced by the Vyāḍi commentator who, showing a
remarkable independence from Patañjali, looks for a jñāpaka for each and every
paribhāṣā collected by his author. No longer is the jñāpaka, as in Kātyāyana, a
device to prove the validity of a given interpretation, but is now viewed rather as a
clue, willingly ‘left behind’ by the source-author himself to replace the fully-fledged
axiom. The sacralisation of the text (which makes each syllable therein not only
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significant but necessary) has somehow provided commentators with a powerful
tool to make this text signify more than what is stated without any need for
modification. Commonly shared hermeneutic principles are no longer accepted,
but each and every principle, however general it may be, must find its validation
within the text itself.
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